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Issues: (i) Whether a tenant who had made an out-of-time and invalid deposit under the deposit provision could be treated as having availed himself of that provision so as to exclude the Revenue Divisional Officer's power to grant time under the eviction provision; (ii) whether the Revenue Court's order granting time to deposit arrears was a legal and judicial exercise of discretion.
Issue (i): Whether a tenant who had made an out-of-time and invalid deposit under the deposit provision could be treated as having availed himself of that provision so as to exclude the Revenue Divisional Officer's power to grant time under the eviction provision.
Analysis: The protection against eviction was intended for cultivating tenants, but the statutory scheme distinguished between a valid deposit made within the time allowed by the Act and an ineffective deposit made outside that time. A tenant can be said to have availed himself of the deposit provision only where he has actually obtained the benefit contemplated by it. An invalid belated deposit, which the court had no jurisdiction to entertain, does not amount to availing oneself of the provision. The bar on granting time under the eviction provision operates only where the tenant has truly taken advantage of the deposit mechanism in the statute.
Conclusion: The tenant had not availed himself of the deposit provision in the statutory sense, and the Revenue Divisional Officer was not divested of jurisdiction to consider time under the eviction provision.
Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue Court's order granting time to deposit arrears was a legal and judicial exercise of discretion.
Analysis: The Revenue Court considered the relevant circumstances, including the dispute over the rent demanded, the tenants' readiness to pay the admitted amount, and the statutory object of protecting cultivating tenants from eviction. The order showed conscious application of mind to whether a concession should be granted. Interference in revision is warranted only where there is patent violation of law, perversity, or absence of judicial discretion, none of which was established.
Conclusion: The Revenue Court validly exercised its discretion in granting time for deposit.
Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the statutory bar was not attracted and the discretionary order of the Revenue Court did not suffer from legal infirmity.
Ratio Decidendi: A tenant is treated as having availed himself of the statutory deposit provision only when the deposit is made in accordance with that provision and yields the statutory benefit; an invalid belated deposit does not exclude the court's power to grant time under the eviction provision.