Special statutory procedure prevails over general powers when a university seeks to terminate employees under its internal rules.

Statute No. 30 created a special, self-contained procedure for cases where an employee's continuance was thought detrimental to the University, and the Ordinances remained subordinate to the Act and Statutes. Once that special screening process was invoked and the matter had gone to the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee, the University could not abandon it midway and fall back on general powers under the employment agreements or Ordinance No. 6. The discretionary language in Statute No. 30 did not permit action outside the statutory scheme, and the general appointing power could not override the special safeguards. The termination resolutions were therefore ultra vires and liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether, after the University had invoked Statute No. 30 and set the special screening procedure in motion, it could abandon that procedure and terminate the employees' services under the agreements and Ordinance No. 6, and whether the impugned resolutions were ultra vires.

Analysis: The statutory scheme made the Ordinances subordinate to the Act and the Statutes, while Statute No. 30 created a special and self-contained procedure for dealing with cases where continuance in office was believed to be detrimental to the University's interests. Once that special procedure was invoked, the matter had to proceed according to that statutory code. The University could not, after referral to the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee, drop the special procedure midway and resort to general powers under agreements or subordinate Ordinances. The discretionary words in Statute No. 30 did not authorise action outside the Statute, and the general appointing power could not be used to defeat the special safeguards built into the statutory process.

Conclusion: The resolutions terminating the appellants' services were ultra vires and liable to be quashed.

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