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Issues: (i) Whether the buyer could insist upon clearance from the Endowment Department as a condition for specific performance when the contract did not impose that requirement. (ii) Whether the appellants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. (iii) Whether time was the essence of the contract for sale.
Issue (i): Whether the buyer could insist upon clearance from the Endowment Department as a condition for specific performance when the contract did not impose that requirement.
Analysis: The contract placed the obligation of obtaining clearance under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act on the purchasers, while the sellers were required only to cooperate and furnish documents contemplated by the agreement. Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was held to apply only in the absence of a contract to the contrary, and the requested Endowment Department clearance was neither a document of title nor a contractual term. The sellers had also clarified that no such permission was required under the applicable trust law.
Conclusion: The appellants were not entitled to insist on Endowment Department clearance as a contractual condition for specific performance.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract.
Analysis: Readiness and willingness in a suit for specific performance must be continuous and must be proved by conduct consistent with performance. The purchasers did not simply tender the balance amount; they coupled performance with additional demands outside the agreement, including further clarification and indemnity-related conditions. The concurrent findings of the courts below that the appellants were not ready and willing were held to be supported by the evidence and not open to interference.
Conclusion: The appellants were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract.
Issue (iii): Whether time was the essence of the contract for sale.
Analysis: Although there is no general presumption that time is of the essence in contracts for sale of immovable property, the intention of the parties may make it so. Here, the agreement expressly stated that time was of the essence, fixed a clear deadline for payment of the balance consideration, and provided for forfeiture on default. Read together, the relevant clauses showed that punctual payment was fundamental to the bargain.
Conclusion: Time was the essence of the contract for sale.
Final Conclusion: The refusal of specific performance was upheld, the purchasers' conduct was found inconsistent with contractual performance, and the contractual time stipulation was enforced.
Ratio Decidendi: In a suit for specific performance, a purchaser cannot compel performance on the basis of conditions not found in the contract, and readiness and willingness must be proved in conformity with the agreed terms, especially where the agreement expressly makes time essential.
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