Appellate interference with acquittal requires perversity or illegality; mere reappraisal of evidence is insufficient.

An appellate court may interfere with an acquittal only where the trial court's appreciation of evidence is manifestly illegal, perverse, or one that no reasonable court could reach. If two views are reasonably possible and the trial court has adopted a plausible view, mere reappraisal or disagreement is not enough to overturn the acquittal. Since the trial court had given cogent reasons for disbelieving the eyewitnesses and no perversity was shown, the High Court's reversal of the acquittal was unwarranted and the acquittal was restored.

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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal by reappreciating the evidence in the absence of perversity, illegality, or an unreasonable view.

Analysis: An appellate court dealing with an acquittal may interfere only where the trial court's appreciation of evidence is vitiated by manifest illegality, perversity, or a conclusion that no reasonable court could have reached. If two views are reasonably possible and the trial court has adopted a plausible one, mere disagreement on reappraisal of evidence is not a sufficient ground to set aside the acquittal. The trial court had recorded cogent reasons for disbelieving the eyewitnesses, and the High Court did not find those reasons unreasonable or perverse.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference with the acquittal was unwarranted, and the appellants were entitled to restoration of the acquittal.

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