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Issues: (i) Whether the procedural requirements of the Original Side rules for contempt had to be followed before action could be taken under the insolvency law. (ii) Whether a direction to bring back money into court could fall within the scope of the insolvency provision dealing with contempt for failure to deliver up property. (iii) Whether the insolvent's failure to comply was wilful and justified committal for contempt.
Issue (i): Whether the procedural requirements of the Original Side rules for contempt had to be followed before action could be taken under the insolvency law.
Analysis: The proviso to Section 90(1) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act preserved the jurisdiction conferred by the Act and prevented the Original Side rules from restricting it. The notice issued by the Court had in any event informed the insolvent of the exact basis of the proposed contempt action, and he had already participated in the inquiry and been given repeated opportunities to comply.
Conclusion: The objection based on non-compliance with the Original Side rules was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether a direction to bring back money into court could fall within the scope of the insolvency provision dealing with contempt for failure to deliver up property.
Analysis: The expression "property" in Section 33(4) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act was held to be wide enough to include money. The argument that the words "deliver up possession" were inapplicable to money was rejected because excluding money would frustrate the purpose of the provision. The Court also held that contempt could be used to enforce such a direction and was not confined to ordinary execution proceedings.
Conclusion: The provision was held applicable to money and to the direction made against the insolvent.
Issue (iii): Whether the insolvent's failure to comply was wilful and justified committal for contempt.
Analysis: The earlier inquiry had found that the insolvent failed to account for a specified sum, which supported the inference that he retained the money. No credible explanation was given for its disposal, loss, or expenditure. The Court therefore found that the failure to bring in the money was deliberate rather than accidental or due to inability.
Conclusion: The insolvent's disobedience was held to be wilful, and committal for contempt was ordered.
Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the contempt jurisdiction under the insolvency law and enforced compliance by ordering committal of the insolvent to jail for six months.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the insolvency statute confers a direct power to punish wilful failure to deliver up property in the insolvent's possession or control, that power is not curtailed by procedural rules made for ordinary contempt applications, and the term "property" includes money.