Special statutory reference procedure treated as exhaustive, allowing omitted questions of law to be referred further.

Where a special statutory procedure exists for compelling reference of questions of law, that remedy is treated as exhaustive and displaces resort to Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The article explains that Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was construed as a self-contained mechanism covering both a refusal to refer and an incomplete reference where properly raised questions were omitted. The singular wording was read as including the plural, so the High Court could require the Tribunal to state the case further and refer additional questions of law. The governing remedy therefore lay under the Income-tax Act, not mandamus under the Specific Relief Act.

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Issues: (i) Whether an application under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act lay to compel the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer additional questions of law when a remedy was available under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. (ii) Whether Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 empowered the High Court to require the Tribunal to state the case further and refer questions of law not included in the original reference.

Issue (i): Whether an application under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act lay to compel the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer additional questions of law when a remedy was available under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

Analysis: The availability of the special remedy under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act displaced resort to Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The statutory procedure for challenging the Tribunal's omission to refer questions of law was treated as the appropriate and exclusive course.

Conclusion: The remedy under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act was not available.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 empowered the High Court to require the Tribunal to state the case further and refer questions of law not included in the original reference.

Analysis: Section 66 was construed as a self-contained provision governing the procedure where an assessee or the Commissioner was dissatisfied with the Tribunal's refusal or failure to refer questions of law. The use of the singular in the section was held not to confine it to a single question, because the singular includes the plural. The provision was read as covering both a complete refusal to refer and an incomplete reference where some properly raised questions were omitted.

Conclusion: The High Court had power under Section 66(2) to require further reference of omitted questions of law.

Final Conclusion: The special reference procedure under the Income-tax Act, 1922 was held to be the governing and exhaustive remedy, and the appeals failed because the Tribunal's partial reference could be dealt with under that provision rather than by mandamus under the Specific Relief Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statutory mechanism exists for compelling reference of questions of law, that mechanism is exhaustive, and the singular expression used in the provision is to be read as including the plural so as to permit reference of multiple omitted questions.

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