Compromise eviction decree under rent control law remains executable where the record shows implied admissions and lawful statutory grounds.

A compromise eviction decree under rent control law is not a nullity merely because of alleged recording errors; it remains executable unless the court lacked inherent jurisdiction. A lawful compromise may sustain eviction where the record shows sufficient express or implied admissions of statutory grounds, and Order 23 Rule 3 CPC can apply to such suits if the compromise is not unlawful. Comparative hardship under the Bombay Rent Act is not a pleading requirement in the plaint; it is considered when the statutory eviction ground is otherwise established. The executing court cannot reopen the merits or take fresh evidence to defeat a valid compromise decree.

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Issues: (i) Whether an eviction decree passed on a compromise under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 was a nullity and therefore inexecutable. (ii) Whether the compromise terms and surrounding record disclosed sufficient implied admissions to sustain the statutory grounds of eviction and make Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable. (iii) Whether comparative hardship under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 had to be specifically pleaded in the plaint.

Issue (i): Whether an eviction decree passed on a compromise under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 was a nullity and therefore inexecutable.

Analysis: A decree is a nullity only when the court passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction. An error in recording or drawing the decree does not make it void. In rent control matters, the executing court may not go behind the decree unless the decree is shown to be ultra vires the court's powers. The compromise decree had been passed by a competent court in a suit based on recognised statutory grounds of eviction.

Conclusion: The decree was not a nullity and was capable of execution.

Issue (ii): Whether the compromise terms and surrounding record disclosed sufficient implied admissions to sustain the statutory grounds of eviction and make Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable.

Analysis: A lawful compromise is binding, and Order 23 Rule 3 applies to eviction suits governed by special rent legislation unless the compromise is unlawful. The compromise terms showed admission of arrears of rent and an arrangement for handing over possession at a future date, which supported an implied admission of the landlord's statutory grounds, including arrears of rent and bona fide personal requirement. The record furnished sufficient material for the court's satisfaction, and the executing court could not reopen the matter by permitting fresh evidence.

Conclusion: The compromise decree was supported by implied admissions and was validly recorded under Order 23 Rule 3.

Issue (iii): Whether comparative hardship under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 had to be specifically pleaded in the plaint.

Analysis: Comparative hardship is a matter for consideration when the court is satisfied that the ground under Section 13(1)(g) is made out. It is not a pleading requirement in the plaint itself. The absence of an express pleading on hardship did not undermine the compromise decree, particularly where the tenant had obtained time to vacate and thereby impliedly accepted the arrangement.

Conclusion: Comparative hardship did not have to be specifically pleaded in the plaint.

Final Conclusion: The compromise eviction decree was executable, the objections to its validity failed, and the landlord was entitled to enforcement of the decree with possession.

Ratio Decidendi: In an eviction matter governed by rent control legislation, a compromise decree is valid and executable if the record discloses some material, including express or implied admissions, on which the court could be prima facie satisfied about the statutory ground for eviction; the executing court cannot treat such a decree as a nullity or take fresh evidence to reopen the merits.

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