Just a moment...
Convert scanned orders, printed notices, PDFs and images into clean, searchable, editable text within seconds. Starting at 2 Credits/page
Try Now →Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether an application under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is 'made' on the date it is posted or only when it is received by the Appellate Tribunal; (ii) whether the High Court has power under section 66(3) to direct the Tribunal to treat a time-barred application as made within time.
Issue (i): Whether an application under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is 'made' on the date it is posted or only when it is received by the Appellate Tribunal.
Analysis: The expression 'made' in section 66(1) was construed in the light of the scheme of the Act and the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946. The language of sections dealing with appeals and references, especially the use of 'made' and 'presented', was read as indicating no real distinction for limitation purposes. Rule 36 made Rules 7 and 8 applicable to applications under section 66(1). Rule 7(2) deemed a postal filing to be presented on the day it is received in the office of the Tribunal, and rule 8 required endorsement of that date. On that basis, the application is treated as made only upon receipt by the Tribunal.
Conclusion: The application under section 66(1) is made only when received by the Appellate Tribunal, not when posted.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court has power under section 66(3) to direct the Tribunal to treat a time-barred application as made within time.
Analysis: Section 66(3) empowers the High Court to act only if it is not satisfied of the correctness of the Tribunal's decision rejecting the application as time-barred. Since the Tribunal had correctly rejected the application as barred by limitation, there was no basis for the High Court to displace that decision. The provision does not confer any inherent power to condone delay; such power must be expressly granted, and none was found in the statutory scheme.
Conclusion: The High Court had no power to condone the delay or direct the Tribunal to treat the application as within time.
Final Conclusion: The reference application was rightly held to be time-barred, and the request for revival of the application could not be granted.
Ratio Decidendi: For a reference application under section 66(1), limitation is computed up to the date of receipt by the Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court cannot direct a time-barred application to be treated as in time unless the Tribunal's rejection is shown to be incorrect within section 66(3).