Bona fide legal advice may justify condonation of delay where the appealability issue is debatable and no negligence is shown.

Mistaken legal advice may constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay where the litigant acted bona fide and without negligence. The Court treated the question whether an appeal lay against dismissal of an election petition as debatable, noted no material suggesting an oblique purpose in pursuing the writ remedy, and accepted the appellant's explanation that he was prepared to furnish security if an appeal was required. On that basis, the advice received was regarded as a possible and bona fide view, sufficient to extend time for filing the appeal under the proviso to section 116A(3) of the Representation of the People Act.

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Issues: Whether delay in filing the appeal should be condoned on the ground that the appellant acted on bona fide legal advice and thus showed sufficient cause under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 116A of the Representation of the People Act.

Analysis: The delay was examined in light of the settled principle that mistaken advice of counsel may, in an appropriate case, constitute sufficient cause, though there is no general rule excusing every error of legal advice. The Court found that the issue whether an appeal lay against an order dismissing an election petition under section 90(3) was debatable, that the appellant had acted without negligence, and that there was no material to suggest any oblique purpose in choosing the writ remedy. The appellant's explanation that he was prepared to furnish security if an appeal was required was accepted, and the advice received, though ultimately erroneous, was held to be a possible and bona fide view.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause for the delay was made out, and the time for filing the appeal was extended under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 116A of the Representation of the People Act.

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