Limitation for second appeal: time between judgment and decree signing could not be excluded, so delay was not condoned.

The second appeal was held barred by limitation because it was filed beyond the prescribed period even after excluding the time spent in obtaining copies. The period between the judgment and the signing of the decree was not excluded, as the application for a copy of the decree was made only after the decree had already been signed. Applying the amended explanation to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the earlier view allowing such exclusion was no longer available. Reliance on the prior Full Bench decision did not justify condonation, and the delay was not condoned.

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Issues: Whether the second appeal was filed within limitation, and whether the delay could be condoned or excluded by taking into account the period between the judgment and the signing of the decree and the time spent in obtaining copies.

Analysis: The appeal was filed after the prescribed period even after excluding the time spent in obtaining copies. The period between the judgment and the signing of the decree could not be excluded because the application for a copy of the decree was made after the decree had already been signed. In view of the amended rule embodied in the explanation to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the earlier view permitting such exclusion was no longer available. Reliance on the earlier Full Bench decision did not justify condonation of delay.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by limitation and the delay was not condoned.

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