Technical meaning of "undischarged insolvent" limits election disqualification absent insolvency adjudication; corrupt practice allegations also failed.

The expression "undischarged insolvent" in Article 191(1)(c) was held to bear its settled insolvency-law meaning, so the Election Court could not declare a returned candidate disqualified without an adjudication by the competent insolvency court under the insolvency statute. On that ground, the election could not be voided. The allegations of corrupt practice, including bribery, excessive election expenditure and misuse of official position, also failed because the evidence was vague, conjectural and unsupported by direct proof. The election-voiding finding was set aside, while the challenge based on corrupt practice was rejected.

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Issues: (i) Whether the returned candidate could be treated as an undischarged insolvent for the purpose of Article 191(1)(c) of the Constitution and the election voided under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 without an adjudication under the insolvency law; (ii) Whether the allegations of corrupt practice, including bribery, expenditure in excess of the permissible limit, and misuse of official position, were proved.

Issue (i): Whether the returned candidate could be treated as an undischarged insolvent for the purpose of Article 191(1)(c) of the Constitution and the election voided under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 without an adjudication under the insolvency law.

Analysis: The expression "undischarged insolvent" was held to carry its legal meaning under the insolvency enactment and not a merely general or ordinary meaning. The scheme of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 shows that questions whether a person is insolvent and whether he remains undischarged are matters for the court constituted under that Act. In the absence of adjudication by the competent insolvency court, the Election Court could not itself determine that the returned candidate was an undischarged insolvent for the purpose of Article 191(1)(c). The disqualification under the Constitution was treated as one requiring strict construction and could not be expanded by importing a broader colloquial meaning.

Conclusion: The returned candidate could not be held disqualified as an undischarged insolvent by the Election Court in the absence of insolvency adjudication; the finding of void election on that ground was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegations of corrupt practice, including bribery, expenditure in excess of the permissible limit, and misuse of official position, were proved.

Analysis: The evidence on alleged distribution of liquor was found vague and unreliable, particularly because the primary witness with direct knowledge was not examined. The evidence relating to alleged excessive expenditure was conjectural and did not establish payment or incurrence by the returned candidate. The allegations of procuring assistance from government servants and misuse of official position also lacked clear and direct proof. On the materials on record, the accusations did not satisfy the standard required to establish corrupt practice.

Conclusion: The allegations of corrupt practice were not proved and the adverse finding on that issue was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeals challenging the voiding of the election succeeded, while the appeal challenging rejection of the corrupt-practice allegations failed, leaving the returned candidate's election restored and the corrupt-practice challenge rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory disqualification uses a legally technical expression, it must be given its settled legal meaning, and the Election Court cannot itself decide insolvency status in the absence of adjudication by the competent insolvency court.

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