Statutory protection depends on the law in force at judgment, and a cancelling notification can revive tenant protection in pending proceedings.

Section 88(1)(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act operated prospectively to exclude notified lands from the Act's protection when the notification was issued, but it did not extinguish rights preserved under the repealed 1939 Act and saved by Section 89(2). Where a later notification cancelled the first while the appeal was pending, the court had to decide the suit on the law in force at the time of judgment. As no exclusion notification was then operative, the tenants could rely on the Act's protection and resist eviction; the landlords' suits were therefore dismissed.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 88(1)(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 operated so as to exclude the lands from the Act from the time the notification was issued, and whether it affected rights said to arise under Section 3A(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939; (ii) Whether the cancellation of the first notification during the pendency of the appeal had to be given effect in deciding the landlords' suit for possession.

Issue (i): Whether Section 88(1)(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 operated so as to exclude the lands from the Act from the time the notification was issued, and whether it affected rights said to arise under Section 3A(1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939.

Analysis: Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 88(1) referred to lands already identified at the commencement of the Act, but clause (d) empowered the State Government from time to time to specify areas by notification. The provision was intended to operate on future notifications and to withdraw the benefits of the 1948 Act from the notified lands when the notification was issued. That operation did not destroy rights preserved under the repealed 1939 Act, which were saved by Section 89(2). The earlier observation that Section 88 was prospective did not control clause (d), which stands on a different footing.

Conclusion: Section 88(1)(d) was effective to exclude the lands from the protection of the 1948 Act upon the issue of the notification, but it did not take away rights preserved under the 1939 Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the cancellation of the first notification during the pendency of the appeal had to be given effect in deciding the landlords' suit for possession.

Analysis: The second notification cancelled the first while the matter was still pending in appeal. The appellate court was therefore bound to decide the controversy on the legal position existing when it rendered judgment. Since no notification under Section 88(1)(d) was then in force, the tenants were entitled to rely on the Act's protection and resist eviction. Any rights that might have accrued from a final decree already executed would stand on a different footing, but that situation did not arise here.

Conclusion: The cancellation notification had to be given effect, and the tenants could claim protection against eviction in the pending proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed, and the dismissal of the landlords' suits was upheld because the law in force at the time of decision did not exclude the lands from the Act's protection.

Ratio Decidendi: A court must decide a pending appeal on the legal position existing at the time of judgment, and a notification issued under a power to specify areas from time to time withdraws the statutory protection only for the period during which it remains in force.

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