Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the discretion under Section 231(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was properly exercised in declining deferral of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
Analysis: The normal rule in criminal trials is examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination in that order, as reflected in Sections 135 and 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 231(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 creates a limited discretion to defer cross-examination, but that discretion is not a matter of right and must be supported by sufficient reasons. The relevant factors include whether the witnesses depose on the same subject-matter, whether there is a real likelihood of prejudice, loss of memory, undue influence, intimidation, or delay, and whether the request is consistent with the duty to proceed day-to-day under Section 309(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On the facts, the request was based only on a bald assertion that defence strategy would be disclosed, while the trial court had recorded concrete reasons for refusing deferment and the High Court reversed that order without reasons.
Conclusion: The refusal to defer cross-examination was justified, and the High Court's order granting deferment was unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A request under Section 231(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be allowed only on sufficient, case-specific reasons showing real prejudice, and not on a bare assertion that the defence strategy may be exposed.