Supreme Court annuls election due to corrupt practice, exceeding expenditure limit. Appeal allowed.

The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of the corrupt practice of exceeding the prescribed expenditure limit under Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the respondent's election was annulled. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court. Appeal allowed.

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Issues Involved:
1. Allegations of corrupt practices under Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
2. Expenditure incurred in connection with election meetings.
3. Admissibility and relevance of police reports as evidence.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Allegations of Corrupt Practices under Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
The appellant challenged the election of the respondent on grounds including canvassing votes based on caste, bribery, improper conduct of the election, improper reception of void votes, and exceeding the prescribed expenditure limit. The bribery charge was not pressed during the trial. The Supreme Court focused on the allegation that the respondent incurred expenditure beyond the prescribed limit, which is a corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of the Act. The limit for the constituency was Rs. 2,000, while the respondent's return showed Rs. 1,865.59. The trial court found an additional expenditure of Rs. 20.50, leaving a margin of Rs. 113.92. The appellant alleged that the respondent suppressed expenses related to election meetings, car hire, and petrol.

2. Expenditure Incurred in Connection with Election Meetings:
The appellant detailed various meetings held by the respondent, estimating costs for pandals, loudspeakers, and electrical fittings. The respondent's written statement generally denied these allegations without addressing specific facts. The trial court allowed the appellant to amend clerical mistakes in the petition but rejected a later amendment application for adding new grounds of corrupt practice after the prescribed period. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's view that each item of expenditure constitutes a separate corrupt practice, clarifying that the corrupt practice is the total expenditure exceeding the limit. The Court cited D. P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma to support that particulars of a corrupt practice can be introduced by amendment without adding new grounds.

The Supreme Court examined when the respondent's election campaign commenced, concluding it started on February 23, 1969, contrary to the respondent's claim of February 27. The Court found that the respondent held meetings on February 23, 24, 26, and 28, as well as March 5 and 6, 1969, based on police reports and other evidence. The respondent admitted to seven meetings but denied others. The Court calculated the average expenditure per meeting as Rs. 32, leading to an additional Rs. 128 for four more meetings, exceeding the prescribed limit.

3. Admissibility and Relevance of Police Reports as Evidence:
The respondent objected to the admissibility of police reports as evidence since the Head-constables were not examined. However, the reports were marked without objection, making them admissible under Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram. The Supreme Court held that once a document is properly admitted, its contents are also admitted, though not conclusive. The police reports were relevant as they were made by public servants in the discharge of their official duties, falling under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The Court referenced the Madras High Court decision in Navaneetha Krishna Thevar v. Ramaswami Pandia Thalavar and the Judicial Committee's decision in Arjuno Naiko v. Modonomohano Naiko, emphasizing the weight of official documents made without anticipation of disputes.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of the corrupt practice of exceeding the prescribed expenditure limit under Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the respondent's election was annulled. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court.

Appeal allowed.

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