2005 (2) TMI 895 - SC - Indian Laws

Legal Assistant's Exclusion as 'Workman' under Industrial Disputes Act

Mangt. of M/s Sonepat Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. Versus Ajit Singh

The Supreme Court held that the respondent, employed as a Legal Assistant, did not qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act due to the ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether the respondent qualifies as a 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.2. Whether the termination of the respondent's services was justified.3. Applicability of the principle of res judicata.Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:1. Whether the respondent qualifies as a 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:The primary issue was whether the respondent, employed as a Legal Assistant, fell under the definition of 'workman' as per Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court initially determined that the respondent's duties were of a 'legal clerical nature,' thus qualifying him as a 'workman.' This decision was upheld by a learned Single Judge and later by a Division Bench of the High Court.However, the Supreme Court scrutinized the nature of the respondent's duties, which included preparing legal documents, giving legal opinions, representing the appellant in various cases, and conducting departmental enquiries. The Court noted that these duties involved a significant degree of creativity and quasi-judicial functions, which are not typically associated with clerical work. Citing precedents, the Court emphasized that the job's dominant nature must fit within the categories mentioned in Section 2(s) to qualify as a 'workman.' The Court concluded that the respondent's role did not meet this criterion, as his job was not merely clerical but involved substantial legal and quasi-judicial functions.2. Whether the termination of the respondent's services was justified:The Labour Court had ruled that the respondent's termination was unjustified due to non-compliance with Section 25F of the Act, which mandates certain procedures for retrenchment. Consequently, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement with 50% back wages. This decision was partially modified by the Single Judge, who awarded compensation instead of reinstatement, considering the respondent's subsequent employment as an advocate and Additional District Attorney.The Division Bench of the High Court later reinstated the Labour Court's order of reinstatement but allowed the respondent to seek further wages through Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court, however, found that since the respondent was not a 'workman,' the Labour Court and High Court's orders regarding his termination and reinstatement were not legally sustainable.3. Applicability of the principle of res judicata:The respondent argued that the appellant could not contest the Single Judge's decision as it had not been appealed, invoking the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court clarified that res judicata, a procedural principle, does not apply to jurisdictional questions. The Court referenced Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, stating that a jurisdictional error cannot be shielded by res judicata. The Court also cited Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, reiterating that jurisdictional questions, if wrongly decided, do not attract res judicata.Conclusion:The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Labour Court and the High Court, ruling that the respondent did not qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the orders regarding his termination and reinstatement were invalid. However, the Court directed the appellant to pay the balance of 50% back wages, as previously agreed, within eight weeks. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.