Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
When case Id is present, search is done only for this
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Don't have an account? Register Here
<h1>New law bars fresh proceedings post-repeal: SC clarifies on Haryana VAT Act.</h1> <h3>Merino Panel Products Limited Versus Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner (I)</h3> Merino Panel Products Limited Versus Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner (I) - TMI Issues Involved:1. Validity of the order dated 27.3.2006 passed by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.2. Applicability of Section 61 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and its amendments.3. Interpretation of the saving clause in the context of repealed and new enactments.4. Jurisdictional authority to initiate fresh proceedings post-repeal of the 1973 Act.Detailed Analysis:Issue 1: Validity of the Order Dated 27.3.2006The petitioner challenged the order dated 27.3.2006, issued by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (the 1973 Act). The assessment for the year 2002-03 was framed on 21.6.2005, and a notice for revision was issued on 17.1.2006. The 1973 Act was repealed with the enactment of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (the 2003 Act) effective from 1.4.2003. The High Court in Hindustan Construction Company Limited vs State of Haryana opined that no notice under Section 40 of the 1973 Act could be issued post-repeal as Section 61 of the 2003 Act only saved pending proceedings, not allowing fresh proceedings.Issue 2: Applicability of Section 61 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and Its AmendmentsThe matter was referred to a Larger Bench due to doubts about the correctness of the Hindustan Construction Company Limited judgment. The Supreme Court upheld this judgment in State of Haryana vs Hindustan Construction Company Limited, stating that Section 61 of the 2003 Act, including its amendments, only saved pending proceedings at the time of enactment, with no power to initiate fresh proceedings.Issue 3: Interpretation of the Saving Clause in the Context of Repealed and New EnactmentsThe Supreme Court clarified that the repeal of an Act followed by a new enactment requires examining the new Act's language to determine if it expresses a different intention. The 2003 Act's Section 61 intended to save only pending proceedings, indicating that matters closed under the 1973 Act could not be reopened. The suo-moto revisional power under Section 40 of the 1973 Act exercised after its repeal was unsustainable.Issue 4: Jurisdictional Authority to Initiate Fresh Proceedings Post-Repeal of the 1973 ActThe Supreme Court's observations emphasized that the 2003 Act's Section 61 saved only pending proceedings, and no fresh proceedings could be initiated under the repealed 1973 Act. The legislative amendments in 2010 were intended to address limitations and constraints under Section 61 of the 2003 Act. Any interpretation saving the revisional power under Section 40 of the 1973 Act without pending proceedings would render the amendment redundant.Conclusion:In the present case, the notice for revision was issued after the repeal of the 1973 Act, making the proceedings initiated against the petitioner for the revision of the assessment order without jurisdiction. The contention that Section 61(2)(d) of the 2003 Act applied to the petitioner's case was dismissed as it did not deal with the exercise of revisional power but only saved benefits granted to industrial units. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the revisional authority's order dated 27.3.2006 was set aside.