Statutory saving clause must yield to later discretionary rent-control scheme in pending eviction proceedings.
Pending eviction proceedings saved by a repealing-and-saving clause had to reflect a later statutory modification where the new Act substantially changed the earlier rule from a mandatory consequence to a discretionary power. The Court held that the modified discretion under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 applied to the pending matter, and the tenant's delayed payment was a relevant factor that should have been considered in exercising that discretion. Because neither the trial court nor the appellate court considered the statutory change, the proceedings were not according to law, and the revisional court ought to have interfered and set aside the order striking out the defence.
Issues: (i) whether pending eviction proceedings under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 had to be governed by the modified scheme in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by reason of the saving provision; and (ii) whether failure to take that statutory change into account made the proceedings not according to law so as to justify interference in revision.
Issue (i): whether pending eviction proceedings under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 had to be governed by the modified scheme in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by reason of the saving provision.
Analysis: The saving provision required pending suits and proceedings to continue under the old Act, but the Court had to have regard to the provisions of the new Act where the later enactment only slightly modified or clarified the earlier law. On comparison, the provision for striking out the tenant's defence under the old Act and the corresponding provision in the new Act were substantially similar, except that the later law replaced a mandatory consequence with a discretionary power. That change was a deliberate modification and therefore had to be applied to pending matters.
Conclusion: The modified discretion under the 1958 Act applied to the pending proceeding.
Issue (ii): whether failure to take that statutory change into account made the proceedings not according to law so as to justify interference in revision.
Analysis: Where the law requires the Court to have regard to a statutory provision, omission to do so means that the proceeding is not according to law. The revisional power extends to correcting such legal error. Since neither the trial court nor the appellate court considered the effect of the saving provision and the later discretionary scheme, the High Court ought to have interfered. The tenant's delayed payment was a relevant circumstance that should have been considered in exercising discretion under the new law.
Conclusion: The proceedings were not according to law and the High Court should have set aside the order striking out the defence.
Final Conclusion: The tenant succeeded in revision because the later statutory discretion had to be applied to the pending case, and the failure to do so vitiated the orders below.
Ratio Decidendi: In pending proceedings saved by a repealing-and-saving clause, if the new Act substantially modifies the earlier provision, the court must apply the modification; failure to do so renders the proceeding not according to law and is correctable in revision.
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