Retrospective omission cannot defeat accrued infancy protection under provident fund law; the three-year benefit continued.

Omission of section 16(1)(d) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 did not retrospectively extinguish infancy protection already accrued to an establishment set up before the omission. The Court applied the principle that repeal or amendment does not destroy vested rights, privileges or protections unless legislative intent to do so is express or necessarily implied, and relied on section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The infancy benefit was treated as an accrued protection continuing for the full three-year period from the date of establishment.

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Issues: Whether omission of section 16(1)(d) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 with retrospective effect withdrew the infancy protection already accrued to an establishment set up before the omission.

Analysis: The statutory history showed that infancy protection under section 16(1)(d) was available for three years from the date of setting up of the establishment, and that the later omission of the clause was brought into force with retrospective effect. The controlling principle applied was that an amendment or repeal does not, by itself, destroy rights or privileges already accrued unless the legislative intent to do so is express or necessarily implied. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reinforced that repeal does not affect rights, privileges or liabilities accrued under the repealed provision in the absence of a different intention. The Court treated the infancy benefit as an accrued protection that continued for the full three-year period from the date of establishment.

Conclusion: The omission of section 16(1)(d) did not take away the appellant's already accrued infancy protection, and the appellant was entitled to the benefit for three years from the date of establishment.

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