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Issues: Whether the absence of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 vitiated the prosecution when the appellant had ceased to be in service on the date the charge-sheet was filed, and whether reinstatement later could relate back so as to attract the protection of sanction.
Analysis: The controlling principle applied was that the sanction requirement under Section 19 attaches to a person who is a public servant at the relevant stage of prosecution, and that a legal fiction cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created. The earlier authorities considered established that deeming an order of dismissal or removal to be ineffective for a limited purpose does not automatically carry with it every incidental consequence, including continued status as a public servant for purposes of sanction. The Court found that the appellant was not in service when the charge-sheet was filed and that his subsequent reinstatement did not retrospectively invalidate the proceedings for want of sanction.
Conclusion: The sanction objection was rejected and the prosecution was held not to be vitiated on that ground.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the framing of charge failed, and the order refusing interference with the prosecution was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: A deeming fiction cannot be extended beyond its legitimate purpose, and a person who had ceased to be a public servant when the charge-sheet was filed cannot claim the benefit of prior sanction under Section 19 merely because the dismissal order was later set aside.