Special statute prevails over general law, validating a dwelling-house lease and preserving title to land outside the lease.

The special law governing Ghatwali lands prevailed over the general Court of Wards Act, so a lease granted for dwelling houses was held valid and binding on future possessors. Long, unquestioned enjoyment of the land supported a presumption that the official act was regularly performed and that the necessary authority and sanction had been obtained. Where the C schedule land was found not to be included in the lease, title remained with the plaintiff; as waste land not susceptible of effective enjoyment, possession was presumed to follow title. The result was that the lease challenge failed for the A schedule land, while the plaintiff succeeded in recovering the C schedule land.

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Issues: (i) whether the lease of 1873 in respect of the A schedule land was valid and binding; (ii) whether the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of the C schedule land on the footing that it was outside the lease and title therefore remained with him.

Issue (i): whether the lease of 1873 in respect of the A schedule land was valid and binding.

Analysis: The special law governing Ghatwali lands conferred power to grant leases for dwelling houses and, where such lands were under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, made such leases binding on future possessors. That special scheme prevailed over the general provisions of the Court of Wards Act. The lease described the purpose as erection of dwelling houses. Although the document was executed by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Court of Wards, the long and unquestioned enjoyment of the land justified a presumption that the official act was regularly performed and that the necessary authority and sanction had been obtained.

Conclusion: the lease of 1873 was valid and binding, and the challenge to the A schedule land failed.

Issue (ii): whether the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of the C schedule land on the footing that it was outside the lease and title therefore remained with him.

Analysis: The courts below had concurrently found that the C schedule property was not comprised in the lease. Title therefore remained with the plaintiff. As the property was waste land not susceptible of effective enjoyment, possession was presumed to follow title.

Conclusion: the plaintiff was entitled to the C schedule land.

Final Conclusion: the decree was modified so that the plaintiff failed as to the A schedule land but succeeded as to the C schedule land, and costs were adjusted proportionately.

Ratio Decidendi: a special statute governing a particular subject prevails over a general statute, and in the absence of timely challenge long-continued official action may justify a presumption of regularity and compliance with statutory requirements.

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