Delegated directions cannot override statutory permit controls; notifications granting unlimited stage carriage permits were held invalid.

State Government directions under Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could not be used to bypass the statutory scheme governing stage carriage permits. The Act required transport authorities to consider specified matters under Section 47 and to observe the legislative policy on preferences and reservations for particular categories. Notifications directing grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit, while restricting relevant considerations, were held to exceed the delegated power, defeat mandatory statutory controls, and operate contrary to the parent Act. The notifications were therefore invalid, void and ineffective.

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Issues: Whether the State Government notifications issued under Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, directing grant of stage carriage permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit and restricting the matters to be considered by transport authorities were ultra vires the Act.

Analysis: The amended statutory scheme showed that Parliament and the State Legislature had introduced specific controls on the grant of stage carriage permits, including relevant considerations under Section 47 and preferences and reservations for specified categories. A general power to issue directions in public interest could not be read so widely as to negate the legislative policy embodied in those provisions. The notifications effectively authorised unlimited permits and excluded consideration of matters which the Act required to be taken into account, thereby defeating the regulatory scheme and overriding the limits of the delegated power.

Conclusion: The notifications were beyond the scope of Section 43-A and were invalid.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the impugned notifications were declared void and ineffective.

Ratio Decidendi: A delegated direction issued in the name of public interest cannot override the substantive policy and mandatory considerations laid down by the parent statute governing grant of permits.

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