Court-restraint period excluded from production-deadline computation; incentive eligibility preserved under restitution principles despite delayed commencement.

A court-restraint period later followed by the grant of wildlife permission was held excludable when computing whether commercial production began within the incentive-scheme deadline, because the project had been blocked for reasons beyond the petitioner's control and no party should suffer by an act of the court. The delayed commencement was therefore not treated as disqualifying. The petitioner was also held eligible to be considered for sales-tax and value added tax deferment benefits, subject to agreed restrictions, including no refund of tax already paid and no benefit beyond the stipulated cut-off date. Restitution and equitable relief were applied to preserve scheme benefits despite the obstructed timeline.

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Issues: (i) Whether the period during which the petitioner was restrained by court orders and later received the requisite wildlife permission was to be excluded while determining whether commercial production commenced within the stipulated time under the incentive scheme; (ii) Whether the petitioner was entitled to be considered for sales-tax and value added tax deferment benefits under the scheme despite the delay in commencement of production.

Issue (i): Whether the period during which the petitioner was restrained by court orders and later received the requisite wildlife permission was to be excluded while determining whether commercial production commenced within the stipulated time under the incentive scheme?

Analysis: The petitioner had obtained provisional registration and had incurred the required investment before the scheme deadline, but its project could not proceed because of restraint orders passed in public interest litigation and the absence of final permission under the wildlife regime. The earlier restraint was later reversed, and the higher court had directed issuance of the necessary authorization, showing that the petitioner had been prevented from acting for reasons beyond its control. Applying the doctrine of restitution and the principle that no party should suffer by an act of the court, the intervening period during which construction and related work were blocked had to be excluded for computing compliance with the commercial production deadline.

Conclusion: The exclusion of the period from 13.07.2000 to 27.02.2004 was justified, and the time limit for commencement of commercial production stood extended accordingly.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner was entitled to be considered for sales-tax and value added tax deferment benefits under the scheme despite the delay in commencement of production?

Analysis: The petitioner had shown sufficient diligence, the delay was explained by litigation and regulatory restraint, and the matter remained alive through representations and committee consideration. The court rejected the objections based on delay, suppression and acquiescence, and held that the petitioner should not be denied the incentive merely because production commenced later due to circumstances not attributable to it. At the same time, the petitioner accepted limits on the benefit, including no refund of tax already paid, no deferment beyond a specified date, and reduction of the otherwise computable entitlement.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to be considered for the incentive benefits, subject to the stipulated restrictions and reductions.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded in part by securing exclusion of the period and a direction to reconsider and extend incentive eligibility on that basis, while limiting the ultimate fiscal benefit through specific conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a party is prevented from fulfilling a scheme condition because of court restraint later found unsustainable, the obstructed period must be excluded for compliance computation, and restitution may be applied so the party is not prejudiced by the act of the court.

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