Improper nomination acceptance does not void an election unless material effect on the result is proved with reliable evidence.

Improper acceptance of a nomination does not by itself void an election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; the election petitioner must prove with positive and reliable evidence that the result was materially affected. The Court reiterated that material effect cannot be presumed from the vote margin or from conjecture about how votes may have shifted, and bare oral assertions on hypothetical voting patterns are insufficient. Applying that standard, the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof, so the election could not be declared void.

---

---

Issues: Whether the election of the returned candidate could be set aside on the ground that the improper acceptance of the nomination of a contesting candidate materially affected the result of the election.

Analysis: Under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, improper acceptance of a nomination does not by itself void the election. The election petitioner must affirmatively prove, by positive and reliable evidence, that the result of the election was materially affected. The Court reiterated that it is not permissible to presume, on conjecture or on the mere margin of votes, how votes cast for the improperly nominated candidate would have been distributed among the remaining candidates. The burden remains on the election petitioner throughout, and oral assertions as to hypothetical voting patterns are insufficient.

Conclusion: The election petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving material effect on the result of the election. The High Court's finding was unsustainable, and the returned candidate's election could not be declared void.

---