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Issues: (i) Whether the notice dated 27.04.2012 was a valid demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (ii) Whether the complaint filed on 05.07.2012 was barred by limitation under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): Whether the notice dated 27.04.2012 was a valid demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: A notice under Section 138 does not require any prescribed form. The material requirement is that the drawer must receive a written demand for payment of the cheque amount within the statutory time. The notice in question referred to the three cheques, recorded their dishonour because of stop-payment instructions, demanded payment of the loan amount corresponding to the cheque amount, and warned of legal action on non-payment. The absence of an express reference to Section 138 did not affect its legal character.
Conclusion: The notice dated 27.04.2012 was a valid demand notice under Section 138.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaint filed on 05.07.2012 was barred by limitation under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: Once the notice dated 27.04.2012 was held to be a valid notice under Section 138, the statutory period under Section 142(b) ran from the expiry of the fifteen-day payment period. The complaint was filed beyond the permissible period and could not be sustained by relying on the later notice dated 24.05.2012, since the earlier valid notice had already triggered the cause of action. Continuation of the complaint would therefore amount to abuse of process.
Conclusion: The complaint was barred by limitation under Section 142(b).
Final Conclusion: The criminal complaint and the summoning order were quashed, as the prosecution was not maintainable after expiry of the statutory limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi: A demand notice under Section 138 need not be in any particular form or mention the section expressly if it clearly calls upon the drawer to pay the cheque amount, and once such valid notice is served, the complaint must be filed within the statutory period under Section 142(b).