Admitted will execution and limited lifetime settlement rights: attestation proof unnecessary, and Section 14(2) governed the property rights.

Execution of a will that is admitted in pleadings does not require proof through attesting witness evidence, because the dispute then concerns legal effect rather than execution. A settlement deed and connected adoption deed that confine a Hindu female's rights to lifetime enjoyment, pocket expenses, maintenance, and reversion on death create only a limited estate, so Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies rather than Section 14(1). Property validly bequeathed to her under the husband's will became absolute and could be further transferred, but the item not so acquired remained with the plaintiff as heir of the adopted son, with mesne profits.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a will whose execution is admitted in pleadings must still be proved by attesting witness evidence under the Evidence Act; (ii) Whether the settlement in favour of the Hindu female created a limited life interest or an absolute estate under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and consequently who was entitled to the suit schedule items.

Issue (i): Whether a will whose execution is admitted in pleadings must still be proved by attesting witness evidence under the Evidence Act.

Analysis: The plaintiff admitted the execution and genuineness of the will and challenged only its legal operation in relation to the suit properties. In such a situation, the evidentiary rule requiring attestation proof for a will is not attracted, because the document is not being propounded against a disputed denial of execution. The admitted fact stands proved, and the controversy was confined to legal effect rather than execution.

Conclusion: The defendants were under no obligation to prove execution of the will by attesting witness evidence.

Issue (ii): Whether the settlement in favour of the Hindu female created a limited life interest or an absolute estate under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and consequently who was entitled to the suit schedule items.

Analysis: The language of the settlement deed and the connected adoption deed expressly showed that the land was given only for pocket expenses and enjoyment during lifetime, with maintenance rights kept intact and with reversion contemplated after death. The later compromise decree also recorded enjoyment for life, confirming the limited character of the right. On those facts, the case fell within Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1). As regards the will of the husband, the properties validly bequeathed to the wife became her absolute property and she could transfer them further. Item 3, which had not passed into such absolute ownership, remained with the plaintiff as heir of the adopted son, with mesne profits.

Conclusion: Section 14(2) applied to the settlement property and not Section 14(1); items 1 and 2 were not recoverable by the plaintiff, while item 3 was recoverable by the plaintiff together with mesne profits.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part: the appellants retained items 1 and 2, but the decree in favour of the plaintiff was maintained for item 3 and mesne profits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where execution of a will is admitted and genuineness is not in dispute, attestation proof is unnecessary; and where a pre-existing limited right in property is expressly restricted to lifetime enjoyment, Section 14(2) governs rather than Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

---