Accomplice evidence needs independent corroboration; a co-accused's confession alone cannot sustain conviction.

Accomplice evidence is legally admissible, but it is unsafe to rely on it unless corroborated in material particulars implicating the accused, and an approver cannot corroborate himself through prior inconsistent or consistent statements. A co-accused's confession under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is only a weak piece of evidence and cannot by itself supply the independent corroboration required by prudence. Because the approver's testimony lacked independent support and the co-accused's retracted confession did not provide sufficient assurance, the conviction could not be sustained.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the approver's evidence could be acted upon without independent corroboration implicating the accused; (ii) whether the confession of a co-accused could by itself furnish sufficient corroboration of the approver's evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the approver's evidence could be acted upon without independent corroboration implicating the accused.

Analysis: An accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on uncorroborated accomplice evidence. But the settled rule of prudence is that such evidence is unsafe to act upon unless corroborated in material particulars so as to implicate the accused. Former statements made by the approver could assist in assessing consistency, but could not amount to the required corroboration, and one accomplice cannot corroborate himself.

Conclusion: The approver's evidence could not be acted upon against the accused unless supported by independent corroboration.

Issue (ii): Whether the confession of a co-accused could by itself furnish sufficient corroboration of the approver's evidence.

Analysis: A confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is a weak type of evidence and can only be taken into consideration along with other proved facts. It cannot be treated as proof by itself, nor can it be the sole foundation for conviction. The confession in question was brief, retracted, and made in circumstances that allowed the possibility of prior concert, so it did not provide the independent assurance required by the rule of prudence.

Conclusion: The co-accused's confession was not sufficient corroboration of the approver's evidence.

Final Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained because the evidence against the accused lacked the independent corroboration required in law.

---