Special leave proceedings are outside rent control protection confined to the Act's own appellate hierarchy.

A special leave petition under Article 136 and any appeal following grant of special leave do not fall within the term "appeal" or "proceeding" in Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The provision was confined to the Act's own statutory hierarchy of suits, appeals and revisions, and its reference to the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal showed that only the ordinary appellate process was intended. Section 22 reinforced that the tenant's right to deposit rent, interest and costs was tied to proceedings under the Act, not to Supreme Court special leave proceedings. The tenant therefore could not claim protection against eviction under Section 13A.

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Issues: Whether an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, and the appeal that follows grant of special leave, fall within the expression "appeal" or "proceeding" in Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 so as to attract the tenant's right to deposit rent, interest and costs and obtain protection against eviction.

Analysis: Section 13A was confined to proceedings pending under the Act itself, namely suits, appeals and revisions within the statutory hierarchy contemplated by the Act. An application for special leave under Article 136 is an extraordinary constitutional remedy and is not equivalent to a regular appeal or to a memorandum of appeal presented under the ordinary appellate structure. The reference in Section 13A(c) to the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal showed that the legislature intended only the conventional appellate process and not proceedings in the Supreme Court by special leave. Section 22 of the Act, which dealt with appeals and revisions from decrees or orders passed under the Act, also indicated that the protection under Section 13A was tied to the Act's own forum structure and not to special leave proceedings.

Conclusion: An application for special leave and an appeal by special leave do not fall within Section 13A, and the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of that provision.

Final Conclusion: The statutory protection for tenants against eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent was held to be limited to the proceedings specifically contemplated by the rent control legislation and did not extend to Supreme Court proceedings by special leave.

Ratio Decidendi: A special leave petition under Article 136 is not an "appeal" or "proceeding" within a rent control provision that is confined, by its text and structure, to suits, regular appeals and revisions under the statute's own appellate hierarchy.

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