Civil court jurisdiction and citizenship inquiry: procedural defects did not vitiate the foreign-citizenship determination on admitted facts.
Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 do not wholly oust civil court jurisdiction in a suit seeking to restrain deportation; the court may entertain the suit but must refer the foreign-citizenship question to the Central Government. The Central Government's determination on voluntary acquisition of Pakistani citizenship is quasi-judicial and ordinarily requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard, yet procedural defects do not invalidate the decision where the applicant's own affidavit admits obtaining a Pakistani passport and the conclusive presumption under the Rules is thereby attracted. On those facts, no material prejudice was shown and the challenge to deportation failed.
Issues: (i) Whether the civil court was barred from entertaining a suit for injunction against deportation where the question whether the plaintiff had acquired foreign citizenship arose. (ii) Whether the Central Government's determination that the plaintiff had voluntarily acquired Pakistani citizenship was invalid for want of personal hearing and for reliance on departmental notes and comments.
Issue (i): Whether the civil court was barred from entertaining a suit for injunction against deportation where the question whether the plaintiff had acquired foreign citizenship arose.
Analysis: The jurisdictional scheme under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 does not exclude civil court jurisdiction over a suit seeking to restrain deportation merely because the plaintiff asserts Indian citizenship. What is barred is the court's own decision on the specific question whether foreign citizenship has been acquired when that question arises in the suit. The proper course is to refer that question to the Central Government and decide the suit in accordance with that determination.
Conclusion: The civil court was not wholly without jurisdiction, and the contrary view taken below was wrong.
Issue (ii): Whether the Central Government's determination that the plaintiff had voluntarily acquired Pakistani citizenship was invalid for want of personal hearing and for reliance on departmental notes and comments.
Analysis: The power under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 is quasi-judicial and requires a reasonable opportunity to meet the presumption arising under Schedule III to the Citizenship Rules, 1956. A personal hearing is ordinarily appropriate, and the decision-maker must apply its own mind. However, on the facts, the plaintiff's own affidavit admitted obtaining a Pakistani passport to return to India, and that admission amounted to a voluntary act within the meaning of the rule. Since the governing presumption was conclusive on those facts, the denial of a personal hearing and the use of departmental material did not cause material prejudice or alter the inevitable result.
Conclusion: The Central Government's determination was not vitiated so as to entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to deportation failed, and the suit for injunction could not succeed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the applicant's own admission establishes voluntary acquisition of a foreign passport attracting the conclusive presumption under the Citizenship Rules, procedural irregularities in the inquiry do not vitiate the determination unless they cause material prejudice or could have changed the result.