Court upholds conviction for illegal strike under Industrial Disputes Act.

The court upheld the conviction of the petitioners for participating in an illegal strike under Section 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The strike was deemed illegal under Section 23(b) as it occurred during ongoing Tribunal proceedings. The court clarified that Ordinance No. VI of 1949 did not impact criminal prosecutions. Emphasizing a general prohibition on strikes during proceedings, the court highlighted the Act's aim to maintain peace for dispute resolution. The conviction was upheld without interference, affirming the fine imposed on the petitioners.

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Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the strike under Section 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Interpretation of Section 23(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. Applicability of Ordinance No. VI of 1949 to the ongoing proceedings.
4. Scope and limitations of Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Strike under Section 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The petitioners were convicted under Section 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for participating in an illegal strike and were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25 each, with a default provision of seven days' imprisonment. Section 26(1) states that any workman who commences or continues a strike which is illegal under the Act shall be punishable with imprisonment or fine or both. The strike in question occurred during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, making it illegal under Section 23(b).

2. Interpretation of Section 23(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
Section 23(b) prohibits strikes during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings. The petitioners argued that the strike should only be considered illegal if it is related to the dispute pending before the Tribunal. However, the court held that Section 23(b) does not limit the prohibition to strikes related to the dispute before the Tribunal. The absence of limiting words similar to those in Section 23(c) indicates a broader prohibition.

The court emphasized that the words "in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award" in Section 23(c) are deliberately absent in Sections 23(a) and 23(b), suggesting a general prohibition on strikes during the pendency of any proceedings before a Tribunal, regardless of the strike's cause.

3. Applicability of Ordinance No. VI of 1949 to the Ongoing Proceedings:
Ordinance No. VI of 1949, effective from April 30, 1949, provided that all proceedings concerning disputes between banks and their employees should be referred to a single Tribunal, and ongoing proceedings should abate. The petitioners argued that this Ordinance should cause the criminal proceedings to abate. However, the court clarified that the Ordinance only affected proceedings for the settlement of disputes and not criminal prosecutions for offenses under the Act.

4. Scope and Limitations of Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The court highlighted the distinction between Sections 23(a) and 23(b) and Section 23(c). While Section 23(c) limits the prohibition to strikes related to matters covered by a settlement or award, Sections 23(a) and 23(b) impose a general prohibition on strikes during the pendency of conciliation or Tribunal proceedings. This general prohibition aims to ensure a peaceful environment for the adjudication of industrial disputes.

The court rejected the petitioners' argument that additional words should be read into Section 23(b) to limit its scope. The court maintained that the plain language of the statute should be adhered to unless it leads to absurdity or injustice, which was not the case here. The court further clarified that the prohibition applies to workmen employed in the specific industrial establishment involved in the dispute, not to employees in different branches or locations.

Conclusion:
The court upheld the conviction of the petitioners, finding no grounds to interfere with the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The strike was deemed illegal under Section 23(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it occurred during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal. The Ordinance No. VI of 1949 did not affect the criminal prosecution of the petitioners. The court emphasized the general prohibition on strikes during the pendency of proceedings to ensure a calm atmosphere for dispute resolution.

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