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Issues: Whether the respondents, having accepted the allotment terms and paid extension fee to avoid resumption of the plots, could later seek refund by relying on the decision in Tehal Singh's case and Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules.
Analysis: The allotment was governed by the 1964 Act and the allotment conditions, including the obligation to complete construction within the stipulated period. The Court noted that after the 1995 Act came into force, the earlier regime was saved and regulated by the new statutory framework, but the present facts were materially different from those in Tehal Singh's case. The respondents had accepted possession, failed to construct within time, paid the demanded extension fee to avoid resumption, and only thereafter sought refund. In such circumstances, they could not accept the benefit of extension and later dispute the liability arising from the same allotment conditions. The doctrines of approbate and reprobate, election, and estoppel barred such a challenge.
Conclusion: The claim for refund was not maintainable, and the High Court's view applying Tehal Singh's case was held unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the impugned judgment was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: A party that knowingly accepts and acts upon allotment conditions and derives benefit under them cannot later repudiate the same liability by invoking a different statutory interpretation when the governing facts are materially distinct.