Court-fee on appeal from letters of administration turns on petition character and decree-like effect, not suit valuation.

An appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 against an order granting letters of administration was examined for court-fee liability under the Court Fees Act, 1870. Proceedings for letters of administration begin by petition, and Section 295 does not convert contentious probate proceedings into a suit for court-fee purposes. Although an order granting letters of administration finally determines the representative right to the estate and has the force of a decree, it is not a decree in the strict sense. On that basis, Schedule II Article 11 and Schedule II Article 17(vii) were held inapplicable, Schedule I Article 1 was also inapplicable because the right was not valuably assessable, and the memorandum of appeal attracted only Schedule II Article 1(e)(5) as an application to the High Court.

---

---

Issues: Whether an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 against an order granting letters of administration is governed for court-fee purposes by Schedule II Article 11, Schedule II Article 17(vii), or Schedule II Article 1(e)(5) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and whether the order appealed from is a decree or an order having the force of a decree.

Analysis: Proceedings for letters of administration are initiated by application or petition and not by plaint. Section 295 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 only requires contentious proceedings to take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular suit; it does not convert them into a suit for purposes of court-fee. The order granting letters of administration finally adjudicates the representative right to the estate and therefore has the force of a decree, but it is not a decree in the strict sense. Schedule II Article 11 applies only where the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree, and Schedule II Article 17(vii) is confined to plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits. Schedule I Article 1 was held inapplicable because the subject-matter in dispute, namely the right to represent the estate, is not capable of valuation in that manner. In the absence of a specific charging provision, the memorandum of appeal was held to fall under Schedule II Article 1(e)(5) as an application or petition presented to the High Court.

Conclusion: The appeal was chargeable with only the fixed court fee prescribed by Schedule II Article 1(e)(5) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the higher court fee demanded by the State was not payable.

---