Saving clause in limitation law preserved the suit by construing "would be barred" to protect filing-time claims.

Section 4(a) of the Marwar Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1949 was treated as ambiguous, and the Court preferred a construction that preserved existing rights of suit unless the legislature clearly intended otherwise. Limitation was described as procedural, but a shortening of the limitation period was not read to defeat suits that would be barred only on institution after the amendment. The words "would be barred" were construed to mean barred at the time of filing, so the suit fell within the saving clause and was also protected by section 9 of the Rajasthan Limitation Act (Adaptation) Ordinance, 1950 and section 30 of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951.

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Issues: Whether section 4(a) of the Marwar Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1949 applied only to suits already barred at the commencement of the Act or also to suits which would be barred when instituted, and whether the suit was saved by the later Rajasthan and Part B States limitation provisions.

Analysis: The provision was held to be ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning. The Court treated limitation as a procedural law but held that a shortening of limitation which comes into force at once should not be construed so as to destroy pre-existing vested rights of suit unless the legislature clearly so intends. Reading the saving clause reasonably, the words "would be barred" were taken to mean barred at the time of institution, so that the grace period extended to suits that would otherwise be time-barred under the amended law. On that basis, the suit was also within the benefit of section 9 of the Rajasthan Limitation Act (Adaptation) Ordinance, 1950 and section 30 of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951.

Conclusion: Section 4(a) was construed in favour of saving the suit, and the suit was held to be within limitation.

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