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Issues: Whether the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and whether the injunction could be sustained when it had the effect of stalling execution of a final decree that had attained finality and where the plea that the earlier suit was time-barred did not render the decree a nullity.
Analysis: The appeal arose from an interim injunction restraining the decree-holders from interfering with the respondent's possession, which in effect prevented execution of the earlier decree. The earlier decree had already been affirmed in appeal, second appeal, and special leave proceedings, and objections under Section 47 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had also failed. The governing principles for temporary injunction require a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and prima facie maintainability of the suit. The Court held that a decree passed by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter does not become a nullity merely because it may have been passed in a time-barred suit; such an error, if any, is not the same as lack of inherent jurisdiction. The respondent's allegations of fraud were treated as directed essentially against the court process and were found insufficient to justify injunction in the face of a concluded decree. The Court further found that the respondent's suit and injunction application were, in substance, an attempt to delay execution and deprive the decree-holders of the benefit of the decree. The balance of convenience and the risk of injury were in favour of the decree-holders, not the respondent.
Conclusion: The respondent failed to establish the conditions necessary for temporary injunction, and the injunction order was unsustainable. The decree-holder appellants were entitled to proceed with execution of the final decree.
Final Conclusion: Interim relief was set aside because it would have improperly obstructed enforcement of a final and binding decree without a sufficient prima facie basis.
Ratio Decidendi: A decree passed by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter is not a nullity merely because the suit may have been time-barred, and temporary injunction cannot be granted where it effectively obstructs execution of such a decree without a strong prima facie case and balance of convenience.