RTI access to banking supervision records prevails over confidentiality claims, with disclosure and severance of exempt material required.

A statutory regulator holding banking supervision material is not a fiduciary for the supervised banks, so exemptions for fiduciary relationship, commercial confidence and economic interest do not justify blanket non-disclosure. The RTI Act, 2005 overrides inconsistent confidentiality provisions in the banking and credit-information statutes, and sections on exemption and severance require disclosure of non-exempt material while protecting only truly exempt portions. Regulatory inspection reports, advisory notes and related correspondence may therefore be disclosed in public interest, subject to lawful severance where needed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Reserve Bank of India and the banks could refuse disclosure of inspection reports, advisory notes, correspondence and related banking supervision material under the exemptions for fiduciary relationship, commercial confidence and economic interest. (ii) Whether the Right to Information Act, 2005 overrides the confidentiality provisions in the banking and credit-information statutes, and whether the material could nonetheless be disclosed in whole or in severed form in public interest.

Issue (i): Whether the Reserve Bank of India and the banks could refuse disclosure of inspection reports, advisory notes, correspondence and related banking supervision material under the exemptions for fiduciary relationship, commercial confidence and economic interest.

Analysis: The exemption under Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is not available merely because information was obtained during banking supervision. The Reserve Bank of India is a statutory regulator acting in public interest and not as a fiduciary for the supervised banks. Information collected in inspections, scrutiny and supervisory action is not protected by a trust-based relationship of the kind contemplated by Section 8(1)(e). The plea of harm to economic interest was found to be unsubstantiated, and disclosure of regulatory findings and supervisory action was held to advance transparency and accountability rather than injure the financial system.

Conclusion: The claimed exemptions under Sections 8(1)(a), 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) were rejected as a basis for blanket non-disclosure.

Issue (ii): Whether the Right to Information Act, 2005 overrides the confidentiality provisions in the banking and credit-information statutes, and whether the material could nonetheless be disclosed in whole or in severed form in public interest.

Analysis: Section 22 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 gives the Act overriding effect, while Sections 8(2) and 10(1) require a balancing of protected interests and severance of exempt portions where possible. The confidentiality provisions in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005 do not create an absolute bar against disclosure under the RTI regime. Where the information is held by the regulator and serves public accountability, it may be disclosed, and any exempt portion can be severed rather than withholding the entire record.

Conclusion: The RTI Act, 2005 prevails, and the impugned directions for disclosure were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were dismissed and the information-seeking applicants were held entitled to disclosure of the requested supervisory information, subject to lawful severance only where a truly exempt portion could be separated.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory regulator holding supervisory banking information is not a fiduciary for the regulated entity, and the RTI Act, 2005 overrides inconsistent confidentiality provisions while requiring disclosure of non-exempt material and severance of exempt portions.

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