Statutory commutation belongs to the executive alone; a court cannot direct sentence commutation or premature release.

The statutory power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, lies exclusively with the appropriate Government and is distinct from the court's power to decide conviction and sentence. A court cannot itself commute a sentence, direct premature release, or compel the executive to formalise commutation as though that decision had already been taken. Constitutional clemency under Articles 72 and 161 remains a separate sovereign power. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's commutation direction as unsustainable, while preserving the convicted person's liberty to seek appropriate executive relief in accordance with law.

---

---

Issues: Whether the High Court could itself commute the sentence by enhancing fine and directing the State Government to formalize commutation under Section 433(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The power to suspend, remit, or commute a sentence under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code is vested in the appropriate Government and is distinct from the judicial power to decide conviction and sentence. The Court noted that constitutional clemency under Articles 72 and 161 is a separate sovereign power, while the statutory power of commutation remains an executive function. A court cannot usurp that function by ordering commutation or by directing premature release as if the executive decision had already been made. At most, the court may leave it open to the convicted person to seek relief from the appropriate Government in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The High Court had no authority to commute the sentence or compel the State Government to formalize commutation under Section 433(c); the order was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the High Court's commutation direction was set aside, while the respondent's liberty to seek appropriate executive relief was preserved.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory power to commute a sentence under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, lies exclusively with the appropriate Government and cannot be exercised by the court.

---