Excise valuation uses the manufacturer's wholesale cash price; dealer restrictions and low sales volume do not defeat ascertainability.

For excise valuation under section 4(a), the controlling price is the manufacturer's own wholesale cash price at the time of removal, not the resale price realised by independent traders in the open market. Genuine dealer agreements with territorial or resale restrictions did not destroy the character of the agreed list price as an ascertainable wholesale cash price, and limited or absent actual dealer sales did not require resort to section 4(b) where the goods were capable of being sold at that price. On that basis, valuation based on retail or consumer prices was invalid and the impugned assessments and demand notices could not stand.

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Issues: (i) Whether, for valuation under section 4(a), the relevant wholesale cash price is the price charged by the manufacturer to its dealers and not the price prevailing in an open market among third-party traders. (ii) Whether dealer agreements containing restrictive covenants and the limited volume of dealer sales prevent the manufacturer's agreed list price from being treated as ascertainable wholesale cash price under section 4(a).

Issue (i): Whether, for valuation under section 4(a), the relevant wholesale cash price is the price charged by the manufacturer to its dealers and not the price prevailing in an open market among third-party traders.

Analysis: The valuation scheme under section 4 turns on the price at the time of removal from the factory, with trade discount alone deductible. The phrase "wholesale cash price" was read in contrast with retail price, and the Court applied the reasoning of the Privy Council in customs valuation cases to hold that excise duty is to be computed on the manufacturer's own price structure, not on prices realised by independent traders on resale. The statutory reference to wholesale market did not require proof of a free market among third parties; it related to the manufacturer's own sale terms at the factory or the nearest place of delivery.

Conclusion: The relevant valuation was the price charged by the manufacturer to its authorised dealers, and not an open-market price charged by third-party dealers.

Issue (ii): Whether dealer agreements containing restrictive covenants and the limited volume of dealer sales prevent the manufacturer's agreed list price from being treated as ascertainable wholesale cash price under section 4(a).

Analysis: The agreements were genuine commercial arrangements made in the ordinary course of business and covered the goods manufactured by the petitioner. Restrictive clauses relating to territorial limits, servicing, and resale price did not destroy the character of the agreed price as wholesale cash price, especially where the agreements reflected the contemporaneous list prices at which the manufacturer was willing to sell. The fact that actual dealer sales were few or even absent for some models did not matter, because the statute also covers goods "capable of being sold" at the stated price. The Court held that the price was ascertainable from the agreements and current list prices, and the limited sales volume did not justify resort to section 4(b).

Conclusion: The dealer agreements did not disqualify the agreed list price from being treated as ascertainable wholesale cash price under section 4(a).

Final Conclusion: The valuation orders and demands based on retail or consumer prices were invalid, and the petitioner was entitled to relief against the impugned assessments and demand notices.

Ratio Decidendi: For excise valuation under section 4(a), the controlling price is the manufacturer's own wholesale cash price at the time of removal, ascertainable from genuine commercial sale terms, and the absence or small volume of actual dealer sales does not by itself compel resort to section 4(b) where the goods are capable of being sold at that price.

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