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Issues: (i) Whether the Government had power under the town planning statute to extend from time to time the period fixed for submission of the draft scheme and whether the relevant date for valuation was the last extended date; (ii) Whether the sanctioned scheme could be varied so as to extend the period for making claims for betterment contribution; (iii) Whether the increase in value within the scheme area was attributable to the scheme so as to sustain liability to betterment contribution; and (iv) Whether the appellate authority, acting as persona designata, had power to remand the matter to the arbitrator.
Issue (i): Whether the Government had power under the town planning statute to extend from time to time the period fixed for submission of the draft scheme and whether the relevant date for valuation was the last extended date.
Analysis: The power under the statute to call for a draft scheme was treated as an original and continuing power. Extension of time was held to be only another exercise of that power, and not an exhausted or spent jurisdiction. The last extension operated as the relevant notification date for fixing market value for the purposes of betterment contribution.
Conclusion: The Government had power to extend the time, and the relevant date for valuation was the last extended date, namely 13 June 1956.
Issue (ii): Whether the sanctioned scheme could be varied so as to extend the period for making claims for betterment contribution.
Analysis: The statute expressly permitted the Government to vary or revoke a sanctioned scheme. That power was not fettered by time, and an amendment enlarging the period for preferring claims for contribution was within the statutory competence of the Government.
Conclusion: The scheme could validly be amended to extend the time for making claims for betterment contribution.
Issue (iii): Whether the increase in value within the scheme area was attributable to the scheme so as to sustain liability to betterment contribution.
Analysis: The statute and the scheme proceeded on the footing that improvement works, amenities, and planned development would generate an increase in value, and that such unearned increment could be recouped through betterment contribution. The statutory framework treated the post-scheme increase as attributable to the scheme itself, leaving no room to apportion the rise to external economic causes for the purpose of defeating the levy.
Conclusion: Liability to betterment contribution was sustained.
Issue (iv): Whether the appellate authority, acting as persona designata, had power to remand the matter to the arbitrator.
Analysis: The appellate authority under the Act was not a civil court but a persona designata. As such, it had only the jurisdiction conferred by the statute and no inherent power of remand. The order sending the matter back to the arbitrator was therefore beyond jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The appellate authority had no power to remand the matter.
Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only to the extent of the remand order, which was set aside, while the findings sustaining the levy and the valuation principle were maintained and the matter was directed to proceed on the correct valuation date before the appellate authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the town planning statute, the Government may extend the time for submission of a draft scheme and vary a sanctioned scheme, the resulting increase in value is liable to betterment contribution as statutory unearned increment, and the statutory appellate authority being a persona designata has no power to remand unless expressly conferred.