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of <h1>Supreme Court ruling: Corrupt practice allegations pre-nomination date irrelevant. Clarification on material facts vs. particulars.</h1> The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that allegations of corrupt practices relating to events before the candidate's official ... - Issues Involved:1. Allegations of corrupt practices under Sections 123(2), 123(3), and 123(3-A) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.2. Vagueness and lack of material particulars in the election petition.3. Non-supply of integral documents referred to in the election petition.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Allegations of Corrupt Practices:The appellant contended that the allegations of corrupt practices in paragraphs 1 to 20 of the election petition were irrelevant as they referred to events prior to April 23, 1991, the date on which the appellant was officially nominated as a candidate. According to the appellant, corrupt practices could only be attributed to a person after they were legally recognized as a candidate, as per the amended definition of 'candidate' in Section 79(b) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The High Court, however, found these allegations relevant, stating that the appellant had been holding himself out as a candidate from April 16, 1991. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's view, holding that the allegations in paragraphs 1 to 20, which pertain to a period before April 23, 1991, cannot amount to corrupt practices. However, the Supreme Court refrained from expressing an opinion on whether these allegations could be relevant for other purposes, leaving it to the High Court to decide at the appropriate time.2. Vagueness and Lack of Material Particulars:The appellant argued that the allegations in the election petition, even those relating to the period after April 23, 1991, were vague, lacked material particulars, and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between 'material facts' and 'full particulars', emphasizing that the failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The Court noted that material facts are those relied upon by a party and necessary for formulating a complete cause of action. The High Court had found that there was a triable issue arising from the pleadings, and the Supreme Court upheld this view, rejecting the appellant's contention as insubstantial.3. Non-supply of Integral Documents:The appellant contended that the non-supply of certain documents, specifically notes made by Milind Ranade and a cassette recording of a speech, which were referred to in the election petition, warranted dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court examined this contention in light of the principles laid down in previous cases. The Court distinguished between documents that form an integral part of the pleadings and those that are merely evidence supporting the allegations. It held that the non-supply of documents that are not integral to the pleadings does not entail dismissal of the petition. The Court found that the documents in question were covered by the latter category, where their purport and contents were set out in the election petition, and thus, their non-supply did not warrant dismissal.Conclusion:The Supreme Court held in favor of the appellant on the first issue, declaring that allegations in paragraphs 1 to 20 relating to the period before April 23, 1991, could not establish corrupt practices. The other two contentions regarding vagueness and non-supply of documents were rejected. The appeal was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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