Registered sale deeds, mortgage by conditional sale, and limited second appeal review: key principles on title and redemption.
A stranger to a registered sale deed cannot defeat title merely by alleging non-payment or inadequacy of consideration, especially where the executant admits execution and receipt; the statutory remedy is a charge for unpaid price, not invalidation of the sale. A document labelled and structured as a mortgage by conditional sale turns on the parties' intention as expressed in the instrument and surrounding circumstances; on the facts stated, it remained security and did not become an absolute sale because tender within time was refused. In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact may be disturbed only if perverse or unsupported by evidence, and the High Court's reappraisal was held beyond the limits of Section 100 CPC.
Issues: (i) whether a stranger to the sale deed could successfully challenge the plaintiff's title on the ground of non-payment or inadequacy of consideration, and whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was genuine and operative; (ii) whether the document executed in favour of defendant No. 1 was a mortgage by conditional sale or an out and out sale, and whether non-payment within the stipulated time converted it into an absolute sale; (iii) whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings in second appeal.
Issue (i): whether a stranger to the sale deed could successfully challenge the plaintiff's title on the ground of non-payment or inadequacy of consideration, and whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was genuine and operative.
Analysis: Defendant No. 2, the executant of the sale deed, admitted the plaintiff's case in writing and in evidence. The plaintiff's title flowed from a registered sale deed, and the challenge that consideration had not been fully paid was raised only by defendant No. 1, who was not a party to that transaction. The Court applied the principle that a party in possession of no personal knowledge of the transaction cannot displace a genuine sale deed merely by alleging non-payment, especially when the executant admits execution and receipt of consideration. It also held that even if the entire price had not been paid, that would not by itself invalidate a registered sale under the Transfer of Property Act, because a sale may be for price paid, promised, or part-paid and part-promised, and the seller's remedy is a statutory charge for unpaid consideration.
Conclusion: The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was valid and conveyed title; the challenge based on non-payment of consideration failed.
Issue (ii): whether the document executed in favour of defendant No. 1 was a mortgage by conditional sale or an out and out sale, and whether non-payment within the stipulated time converted it into an absolute sale.
Analysis: The document itself described the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale and embodied the condition of repurchase within the same instrument. The true test was the intention of the parties as reflected in the document and surrounding circumstances. On that test, the transaction was held to be security for money and not an outright sale. The Court further held that where the mortgagor had tendered the mortgage money within time and the mortgagee refused to accept it, there was no default by the mortgagor. Accordingly, the stipulation that the property would become the mortgagee's property on default did not operate, and the mortgage did not ripen into an absolute sale.
Conclusion: The document was a mortgage by conditional sale, not an out and out sale, and it did not become absolute on the facts found.
Issue (iii): whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings in second appeal.
Analysis: The Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired valid title and was entitled to redeem the mortgage. The High Court reversed those findings on a reappraisal of evidence, although interference in second appeal was permissible only if the findings were perverse or unsupported by evidence. The Court held that the High Court exceeded the limited jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because the concurrent findings were based on evidence and were not shown to be perverse.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in upsetting the concurrent findings in second appeal.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree granting redemption in favour of the plaintiff was restored.
Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse or unsupported by evidence; a registered sale is not invalid merely because part of the price remains unpaid, and a mortgage by conditional sale depends on the intention of the parties as embodied in the same instrument.