Court grants petitioner 30 days to respond to show cause notice, emphasizes unbiased assessment of limitation period. Commissioner to ensure strict legal compliance.

The Court dismissed the writ application, granting the petitioner an additional 30 days to respond to the show cause notice. The Court emphasized the need for the adjudicating authority to independently assess the application of the extended limitation period without bias from prior observations. The petitioner was allowed to present all arguments during the adjudication, with the Commissioner instructed to handle the matter in strict compliance with the law.

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Issues Involved:
1. Challenge to the demand-cum-show cause notice dated 22.9.2014.
2. Conditions precedent for invoking the extended period of limitation.
3. Classification of the transaction under "Renting of Immovable Property Services".
4. Suppression of facts by the petitioner.
5. Jurisdiction of the writ court to entertain the petition.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Challenge to the demand-cum-show cause notice dated 22.9.2014:
The petitioner, Bhubaneswar Development Authority (B.D.A.), challenged the demand-cum-show cause notice dated 22.9.2014, asserting that the notice was issued without proper jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that the premium received prior to 1.7.2010 could not be subjected to service tax as the taxable service "Renting of Vacant Land" was introduced only on that date. The petitioner relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Infinity Infotech Parks Ltd. v. Union of India to support their contention.

2. Conditions precedent for invoking the extended period of limitation:
The petitioner contended that the conditions for invoking the extended period of limitation were absent, as the Commissioner had not properly applied his mind to the question of whether these conditions existed. The petitioner argued that the show cause notice amounted to a wrongful invocation of jurisdiction and should be quashed. The Service Tax Department, on the other hand, argued that the facts indicated suppression of material information by the petitioner, justifying the invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

3. Classification of the transaction under "Renting of Immovable Property Services":
The Service Tax Department classified the transaction between B.D.A. and M/s. Unitech Ltd. under "Renting of Immovable Property Services." The lease deed dated 30.09.2010 indicated that the land was leased for development and construction of commercial buildings, and the consideration amount of Rs. 52.75 Crore was received by B.D.A. on 14.3.2008. The Department argued that the nature of the transaction was a lease or rent, not a sale, and thus fell under the taxable service category as per Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994, and subsequent amendments.

4. Suppression of facts by the petitioner:
The Department alleged that B.D.A. had suppressed facts regarding the provision of "Renting of Immovable Property Service," "Commercial or Industrial Construction Service," "Security Service," and "Advertisement Service" to M/s. Unitech Ltd. B.D.A. had not paid any service tax on the amounts received and had failed to declare these details in their statutory ST-3 Returns for the period 2010-11. This suppression was viewed as willful, with the intent to evade payment of service tax, justifying the extended period of limitation for recovery.

5. Jurisdiction of the writ court to entertain the petition:
The Service Tax Department argued that the writ court should not entertain the petition as an ordinary remedy was available, and judicial discipline required allowing the department to reach its own conclusion. The Department cited the Supreme Court judgment in C.C.T. Orissa & Ors. v. Indian Explosives Ltd., which emphasized that the High Court's intervention at this stage could prejudice the statutory authorities' interests. The Court noted the Supreme Court's judgment in Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. M/s. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, which established that the extended period of limitation required proof of fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts.

Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the writ application, allowing the petitioner an additional 30 days to file a show cause reply and participate in the proceedings. The Court emphasized that the adjudicating authority must independently determine whether the extended period of limitation applied, without being influenced by any observations made during the hearing. The petitioner was granted the liberty to raise all contentions during the adjudication process, and the Commissioner was directed to deal with the matter strictly in accordance with the law.

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