Liberal condonation of delay in government appeals limits revisional interference where the explanation is reasonable and non-arbitrary.

Delay in filing a government appeal was condoned on the basis of a reasonable explanation covering departmental movement of the proposal and the clerk's medical leave. The Court applied the settled liberal and pragmatic approach to condonation of delay, noting that some latitude is warranted in governmental decision-making and that the Tribunal's discretion showed no arbitrariness or perversity. It also stated that an order condoning delay does not fall within the specified substantive provisions of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008 so as to attract revision. On that footing, revisional interference was held unwarranted.

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Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in filing the Revenue's appeal and whether the High Court should interfere in revision under section 58 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Analysis: The delay was explained by reference to the movement of the proposal for filing the second appeal within the departmental hierarchy and the medical leave of the concerned clerk. The Court held that, even assuming an earlier receipt of the appellate order, the relevant period before receipt of the proposal was of limited significance. Applying the settled principle that applications for condonation of delay must receive a liberal and pragmatic approach, and that some latitude is warranted in cases involving governmental decision-making, the Court found no arbitrariness or perversity in the Tribunal's exercise of discretion. It also held that an order condoning delay is not one made under section 57(7) or section 57(8) so as to attract revisional interference under section 58.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's order condoning delay did not call for interference in revision, and the revision failed.

Ratio Decidendi: An order condoning delay, if passed on a reasonable explanation and without arbitrariness or perversity, should not ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction, particularly where the governing statute confines revision to orders covered by the specified substantive provisions.

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