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Issues: Whether the execution of the consent decree was barred by limitation, and whether the obligation to obtain the certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act postponed enforceability of the decree or attracted extension of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
Analysis: The consent decree expressly provided that the defendants were to sell and convey the lands as and when called upon to do so, and the Court held that the decree was enforceable from the date it was passed. The requirement to obtain a certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act was not treated as a condition precedent that suspended the running of limitation, because the decree did not postpone enforceability to a future date or on the happening of any stipulated event. The Court applied the settled principle that, for Article 136, the relevant question is when the decree became enforceable and not when it became executable. It further held that Section 18 of the Limitation Act could not assist the decree-holder in execution, and the alleged later payments did not extend the limitation period for execution of the decree.
Conclusion: The execution proceedings were held to be barred by limitation in respect of the conveyance sought, and no interference was warranted with the executing court's order.
Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, a decree becomes enforceable when it is passed unless the decree itself postpones enforcement to a future date or on a specified contingency; a collateral contractual stipulation does not suspend limitation for execution.