Court dismisses petition, decree enforceable from date passed, arguments on Income Tax Act and Limitation Act rejected. Trial Court judgment upheld.

The court dismissed the petition, affirming that the execution proceeding for the conveyance was barred by limitation but held that the decree was enforceable from the date it was passed. The court rejected arguments based on Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act and Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act. The Trial Court's judgment was upheld, and the writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Bar of limitation for execution of conveyance.
2. Enforceability of the decree.
3. Applicability of Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act.
4. Interpretation of consent decree terms.
5. Applicability of Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Bar of Limitation for Execution of Conveyance:
The primary issue was whether the execution of the conveyance was barred by limitation. The Executing Court held that the execution proceeding was not barred by limitation entirely but was barred concerning the conveyance of the suit property. The Executing Court observed that the decree was enforceable from the date it was passed, and the limitation period could not be suspended indefinitely due to the non-obtainment of the certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act.

2. Enforceability of the Decree:
The decree in question was deemed enforceable from the day it was passed. The court noted that the decree was not conditional or contingent upon the occurrence of certain events. The consent terms reflected an agreement between the parties, translating into a decree with all the attributes of a decree, thus executable under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The court held that the enforceability of the decree arose immediately upon its pronouncement, and the period of limitation started from that date.

3. Applicability of Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act:
The court held that the condition of obtaining the certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act was not a condition precedent for the enforceability of the decree. The Executing Court rightly observed that the period of limitation would not stand suspended until the certificate was obtained. The repeal of Section 230-A in 2001 did not aid the Decree Holder as the decree was enforceable from the date it was passed.

4. Interpretation of Consent Decree Terms:
The court examined clauses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the consent decree. It was concluded that the decree was enforceable from the day it was passed and was not contingent upon the happening of certain events. The submission that the execution proceeding arose only when the Defendants failed to comply with the advocate's notice dated 12-1-2010 was not accepted. The court held that the decree was enforceable from the date of its pronouncement, and the analogy with an agreement containing a covenant for compliance as and when called upon could not be applied.

5. Applicability of Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act:
The Decree Holder's reliance on Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act, contending that the limitation period would get extended due to payments made between 2004 to 2007, was rejected. The court noted that the receipts did not disclose that the payments were made in lieu of the flat to be handed over to the Judgment Debtors. Moreover, clause (c) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides that an application for execution shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right, thus making Section 18(1) inapplicable to the execution of a decree.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, affirming that the execution proceeding for the conveyance was barred by limitation and that the decree was enforceable from the date it was passed. The submissions based on Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act and Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act were not accepted. The impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court were upheld, and the writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

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