Larger Bench precedent and true petition character control Article 226/227 scope and Letters Patent Appeal maintainability.

Larger Bench precedent governs when Supreme Court decisions appear to conflict on the scope of Articles 226 and 227, and later smaller-Bench reasoning cannot displace binding certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction rulings. The text also states that maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal depends on the true nature of the controversy, pleadings and reliefs, not on the petition's label alone. Where the facts justify invocation of Article 226, an appeal is not barred merely because the Single Judge referred to Article 227. A writ petition against a purely private respondent remains unavailable unless statutory infraction or collusion with a statutory authority is shown.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in the face of conflicting Supreme Court decisions, the larger Bench view had to be followed on the scope of Articles 226 and 227 in a landlord-tenant dispute and on the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal; (ii) Whether a petition styled under Articles 226 and 227 could support a Letters Patent Appeal where the learned Single Judge had exercised jurisdiction on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether, in the face of conflicting Supreme Court decisions, the larger Bench view had to be followed on the scope of Articles 226 and 227 in a landlord-tenant dispute and on the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal.

Analysis: The governing principle of precedent required the larger Bench decision to prevail. The judgment held that the later two-Judge decision did not overrule or dilute the earlier larger Bench rulings on certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction, and that the ratio of the later case was confined to a pure private dispute where no public authority was involved. It further held that the larger Bench view in the cited authorities remained binding, and that the earlier Division Bench had misread the later decision while ignoring the controlling law on ratio decidendi and judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The larger Bench view was binding, and the earlier Division Bench ought to have followed it.

Issue (ii): Whether a petition styled under Articles 226 and 227 could support a Letters Patent Appeal where the learned Single Judge had exercised jurisdiction on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The nature of the controversy, the pleadings and the reliefs sought determine whether Articles 226 and 227 are both invoked. Where facts justify invocation of Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal is not barred merely because the learned Single Judge referred to Article 227. The judgment held that the maintainability question turns on the true character of the petition and the order, not on nomenclature alone, and that a writ petition is not maintainable against a purely private respondent unless statutory infraction or collusion with a statutory authority is shown.

Conclusion: The Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable if the facts justified invocation of Article 226, and the contrary view was not correct.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered in favour of the appellants on the questions of precedent and maintainability, and the connected Letters Patent Appeal was directed to be placed before the competent Division Bench for further consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: In determining whether a Letters Patent Appeal lies and whether Article 226 is properly invoked, the court must look to the true nature of the controversy, pleadings and reliefs, and must follow the binding larger Bench precedent on certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction; nomenclature alone is not decisive.

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