Issues: Whether equipment moved from the Domestic Tariff Area to a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one petroleum contract and subsequently cleared into the Domestic Tariff Area under a fresh essentiality certificate for another contract qualifies as re-imported goods entitled to exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The concessional import benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Customs is conditional upon the equipment being deployed for the petroleum operation certified under the relevant essentiality certificate. Condition No. 48 of that notification provides a specific mechanism for transfer of equipment to another specified person for a subsequent eligible petroleum operation, subject to prescribed undertakings and customs safeguards. That express mechanism cannot be displaced by an implied alternative route through a Free Trade Warehousing Zone yielding an additional fiscal benefit.

Analysis: The statutory fictions under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 regarding the customs treatment of Special Economic Zones and clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area operate for their prescribed purposes and do not create a universal re-import exemption. Re-import requires not merely identity of goods but continuity between the outward movement and their return. Equipment warehoused in a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one contract, and later cleared only upon securing a new domestic contract and a fresh essentiality certificate, is not returned in reversal of the earlier transaction. The original certified deployment is a closed transaction and the later clearance is founded on a distinct transaction. Rule 48(3) of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 does not apply where the Free Trade Warehousing Zone merely holds the owner's goods without procuring them.

Conclusion: The subsequent clearance of the equipment from the Free Trade Warehousing Zone into the Domestic Tariff Area is a fresh import and not a re-import under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; the claimed exemption is unavailable against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service; (ii) Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers Business Auxiliary Service. The agreements with banks and the insurer showed that the assessee promoted and marketed their lending and insurance services by informing dealers and customers about the available facilities and facilitating customer referrals. The referral charges were consideration for that promotional activity.

Conclusion: The referral charges are taxable as Business Auxiliary Service, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires the Department to refrain from issuing a notice where the short-paid tax liability is discharged before notice. The entire liability had been paid before the show-cause notice, and uncertainty regarding taxability accounted for the non-disclosure of referral income under Business Auxiliary Service in the returns.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is unsustainable and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service tax remains payable on the referral charges, while the surviving penalty liability is removed.

Ratio Decidendi: Referral activity undertaken under agreements to promote banks' lending and insurers' services constitutes Business Auxiliary Service; where the tax liability is fully discharged before the show-cause notice, penalty cannot be sustained under the pre-notice payment framework.

Issues: Whether the pending reply to the show-cause notice proposing cancellation of GST registration required expeditious consideration by the tax authorities.

Analysis: The petition was confined to seeking an early decision on the reply already filed against the show-cause notice. No adjudication was made on the allegations underlying the proposed cancellation of registration.

Outcome: The respondent authorities were directed to consider and decide the matter expeditiously, preferably within three weeks.

Issues: Whether the statutory appellate remedy against cancellation of GST registration could be reopened despite delay beyond the limitation prescribed for appeal.

Analysis: The adopted ruling recognises that cancellation of GST registration has serious consequences for the conduct of business. Though the Appellate Authority is bound by the statutory outer limit for condoning delay, constitutional writ jurisdiction may be exercised in an appropriate case where the delay is plausibly explained and refusal to entertain the appeal would cause disproportionate hardship. The merits of the cancellation proceedings, including service of notice and compliance with natural justice, remain for the Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The appellate remedy must be reopened and the appeal must receive merits consideration without rejection on limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity.

Analysis: Section 29(2)(c) of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits cancellation where returns have not been furnished continuously for six months, subject to an opportunity of hearing. The cancellation notice disclosed the return-default, but no reply was furnished. The effective date fell within, and not before, the period of default; it was therefore not retrospective cancellation in the strict sense requiring specific reasons for operation before the default. Section 29 requires notice of the proposed cancellation and does not require a further notice concerning the precise consequential date from which cancellation may operate.

Conclusion: The cancellation proceedings and cancellation order were valid; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes a defined appeal period and a limited additional period for condonation. The appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that maximum period. Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be used to defeat this statutory limitation; interference after expiry may arise only in exceptional circumstances, such as patent lack of jurisdiction or a complete denial of natural justice. No such circumstance was established. Earlier contrary coordinate-bench decisions, having not accounted for binding precedent and an earlier binding coordinate-bench decision, were treated as per incuriam.

Conclusion: No writ relief to condone the delay or remit the appeal for merits consideration was warranted; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The registration cancellation and the appellate order refusing to entertain the belated appeal remain legally effective.

Ratio Decidendi: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be invoked to circumvent a statutory appellate limitation that expressly restricts condonation, absent exceptional jurisdictional or natural-justice infirmity.

Issues: Whether the transfer and centralisation of the assessee's case to Nashik under Section 127 was justified after completion of the searched person's assessment.

Analysis: The transfer was founded on administrative convenience and co-ordinated investigation concerning the searched person. That person's assessment had already been completed before the transfer orders were issued. Consequently, the stated purpose for centralising the assessee's case at Nashik no longer subsisted, and no reason remained for transferring the case from Mumbai.

Conclusion: The transfer orders were quashed, and the assessee's assessment is to be conducted in Mumbai under the appropriate charge.

Issues: Whether a transferee importer using DFIA licences obtained through fraudulent exports is liable for customs duty and penalty despite claiming to be a bona fide purchaser.

Analysis: The DFIA licences used for duty-free imports had been procured on the basis of fabricated exports. The importer did not independently verify the genuineness of the licences, underlying exports, issuing exporter, or related customs documentation. Mere purchase through intermediaries and payment through banking channels did not establish the requisite due diligence. The materially identical fraud investigation and the governing coordinate-bench decisions required transferee importers to verify the authenticity of the licences and release documents; reliance solely on brokers was insufficient.

Conclusion: The transferee importer was liable for the customs duty and penalty because the fraudulently obtained DFIA licences were void ab initio and no due diligence was established. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18; (ii) Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.

Issue (i): Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18.

Analysis: The export bonds expressly recorded an undertaking to pay duty finally assessed and were executed under Section 18, establishing that the exports were provisionally assessed rather than finally reassessed under Section 17. Regulation 5 of the Customs (Finalization of Provisional Assessment) Regulations, 2018 required finalisation within two months of receipt of the test reports. No final assessment had been made. Recovery proceedings for non-levy or short-levy under Section 28 could not be initiated while the assessment remained provisional.

Conclusion: The show cause notices and consequential duty demands issued before finalisation of the provisional assessments were premature and legally unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.

Analysis: The goods were exported on execution of Section 18 bonds and were neither seized under Section 110 nor provisionally released. Since the exported goods were unavailable for confiscation, imposition of redemption fine under Section 125 was not sustainable.

Conclusion: Redemption fine and penalties were not imposable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Recovery action must follow finalisation of the provisional assessments, and exported goods unavailable for confiscation cannot attract redemption fine.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery proceedings for short-levy cannot be maintained under Section 28 while an assessment made under Section 18 remains unfinalised; redemption fine cannot be imposed where exported goods are unavailable for confiscation.

Issues: Whether conversion of shipping bills from the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the Duty Drawback Scheme could be denied on the basis of the three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. or the subsequently issued notification prescribing a time limit.

Analysis: Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 does not prescribe a limitation period for amendment of shipping bills after export, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence. The three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. was ultra vires Section 149 and could not defeat entitlement to a consequential export benefit. Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.) dated 22.02.2022, prescribing time limits for post-export conversion in specified cases, could not be applied retrospectively to exports made before its issuance.

Conclusion: Conversion of the shipping bills from Advance Authorisation to Duty Drawback could not be denied on limitation grounds, and the export benefit was required to be extended in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a public authority is obliged under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to obtain information from a private body in order to furnish it to an information applicant.

Analysis: The right to information extends to material held by or under the control of a public authority. Information relating to a private body is disclosable only where the public authority can access it under another law, subject to the preconditions and restrictions imposed by that law. The Act does not require a public authority to collect, collate, create, or obtain information that is not available in its records merely to answer an information request. The impugned directions requiring the regulator to procure information from a private exchange were inconsistent with this position.

Conclusion: A public authority is not obliged to obtain information from a private body solely for furnishing it under the Right to Information Act, 2005; the impugned directions were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a company petition dismissed for want of prosecution could be restored despite the restoration application being filed beyond the thirty-day period under Rule 48 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016.

Analysis: Rule 48(2) prescribes thirty days for seeking restoration upon sufficient cause for non-appearance, but does not impose an absolute prohibition against restoration after that period. The provision must be read harmoniously with Rule 11, which preserves inherent powers necessary to meet the ends of justice. The explanation that counsel missed the hearing because the sitting was preponed remained unrebutted. The restoration application had also been accompanied by a delay-condonation application which was not registered or placed before the Tribunal; the applicant could not be prejudiced by that omission.

Conclusion: The thirty-day period under Rule 48(2) was capable of condonation in the circumstances, and the restoration application was maintainable. The dismissal order was set aside and the company petition was restored for decision on merits.

Issues: Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stays prosecution under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against directors or persons responsible for a company, where the company issued the dishonoured cheque towards its own debt.

Analysis: Section 96 applies to legal action or proceedings in respect of the debt of the person against whom personal insolvency resolution is initiated. A company has an independent juristic existence, and a debt incurred by it remains its debt; it does not become the personal debt of its directors. Directors are prosecuted under Section 141 because of statutory vicarious liability, which does not alter the character of the underlying corporate debt. The binding position is that proceedings under Section 138 are penal in character and are not merely debt-recovery proceedings; personal insolvency moratorium cannot be invoked to avoid criminal prosecution. The pending reference concerning the compensatory component of such proceedings does not dilute the binding effect of the existing decisions or warrant suspension of trials. Any moratorium affecting recovery of compensation, if ordered, does not justify staying the criminal trial.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium under Section 96 does not stay the prosecutions under Sections 138 and 141 against the directors or responsible persons; the issue is decided against the Applicants/Petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: A personal insolvency moratorium does not bar criminal prosecution of directors under Sections 138 and 141 for dishonour of a cheque issued by the company towards its corporate debt, since vicarious criminal liability does not convert that corporate debt into the directors' personal debt.

Issues: (i) Whether cognizance orders in cheque-dishonour complaints could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction when the trials had reached the defence-evidence stage and the objections turned on disputed facts; (ii) Whether two complaints concerning ten dishonoured cheques arising from the same transaction were maintainable; (iii) Whether non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns or an alleged breach of the Income-tax Act invalidated the debt or rebutted the statutory presumption.

Issue (i): Whether cognizance orders in cheque-dishonour complaints could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction when the trials had reached the defence-evidence stage and the objections turned on disputed facts.

Analysis: Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is exceptional and cannot be used to conduct a mini-trial or resolve contested matters such as whether the cheques were security cheques, the existence of a legally enforceable debt, service of demand notice, or the effect of a settlement. The complaints prima facie disclosed the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 remained available for consideration at trial. As defence evidence had substantially progressed, factual appreciation properly lay with the Trial Magistrate.

Conclusion: Quashing of the cognizance orders and complaints was not warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether two complaints concerning ten dishonoured cheques arising from the same transaction were maintainable.

Analysis: The ten cheques were covered by two demand notices, with one complaint relating to nine cheques and the other to one cheque. Separate complaints founded on the two notices were within the Trial Magistrate's jurisdiction. A consolidated demand notice may validly cover dishonour of multiple cheques arising from the same transaction.

Conclusion: The two cheque-dishonour complaints were maintainable.

Issue (iii): Whether non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns or an alleged breach of the Income-tax Act invalidated the debt or rebutted the statutory presumption.

Analysis: Section 269B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns acquisition of immovable property for undervaluation and has no relevance to cheque-dishonour proceedings. Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regulates the mode of accepting specified sums; its breach attracts the statutory penalty under Section 271D and does not make the underlying transaction unenforceable. Non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns does not, by itself, displace the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Conclusion: The alleged income-tax non-compliance did not invalidate the debt or rebut the statutory presumption.

Final Conclusion: The cheque-dishonour proceedings must continue to conclusion before the Trial Magistrate on the evidence led by the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked to adjudicate disputed defences or displace statutory presumptions in a cheque-dishonour prosecution that prima facie satisfies Section 138 and has reached an advanced stage of trial.

Issues: Whether the accused-applicant should be released on bail pending trial.

Analysis: The limited role attributed to the accused-applicant as a mediator, the absence of apparent knowledge that the concerned firm was allegedly non-existent, filing of the charge sheet, and absence of criminal history were treated as relevant. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the prosecution case.

Outcome: Bail granted pending trial.

Issues: Whether refusal to condone the delay of approximately 968 days in filing customs appeals disclosed any perversity or substantial question of law warranting interference.

Analysis: An appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act lies only on a substantial question of law and does not permit re-appreciation of factual findings unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or reached by ignoring material evidence. Under Section 129A(3) and (5), condonation requires sufficient cause, assessed with reference to bona fides, diligence and a satisfactory explanation for the entire delay. The appellants participated in the adjudication through counsel, the order was sent to that counsel by e-mail, attempts were made to dispatch it to the recorded address, and it was displayed on the notice board. The appellants made no enquiry about the adjudication outcome for nearly three years, and the explanation did not account for this prolonged inaction. The Tribunal's rejection of condonation was based on a cumulative assessment of relevant material and could not be displaced by seeking a different factual view.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone the delay was lawful and disclosed no perversity, error of law, or substantial question of law; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's request under Section 149 for conversion of free shipping bills into EPCG shipping bills could be rejected as time-barred under Circular No. 36/2010-Customs or Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.); (ii) Whether conversion of the free shipping bills to EPCG shipping bills was permissible on the available contemporaneous documentary evidence despite the absence of physical examination at export.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's request under Section 149 for conversion of free shipping bills into EPCG shipping bills could be rejected as time-barred under Circular No. 36/2010-Customs or Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.).

Analysis: Section 149 permits post-export amendment where documentary evidence existed at the time of export. The three-month period prescribed by paragraph 3(a) of Circular No. 36/2010-Customs was ultra vires Section 149 and could not curtail the statutory power of amendment. Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.) and the Regulations made thereunder expressly apply only to shipping bills filed on or after their publication and contain no retrospective operation. Its one-year limitation therefore could not govern exports completed in 2007.

Conclusion: The conversion request could not be rejected as time-barred; the time limits in the Circular and the 2022 Notification were inapplicable to the shipping bills in question, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether conversion of the free shipping bills to EPCG shipping bills was permissible on the available contemporaneous documentary evidence despite the absence of physical examination at export.

Analysis: The shipping bills, export-duty payment records, invoices and bank realisation certificates corroborated the identity, export and realisation of consideration for the exported iron ore. The statutory condition for post-export amendment is contemporaneous documentary evidence, not a fresh physical examination after export. A clerical omission to mention the EPCG authorisation cannot deny an otherwise available substantive export benefit where the relevant documentary evidence supports eligibility.

Conclusion: The free shipping bills are required to be considered for conversion to EPCG shipping bills on verification of the documentary evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory mechanism for post-export amendment remains available for the exports concerned, and the customs authorities must process the conversion request on its merits within eight weeks.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-export shipping-bill amendment under Section 149 cannot be denied by a circular-imposed limitation that is ultra vires the statute or by a subsequently enacted regulation that operates only prospectively, where contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the claimed export-scheme eligibility.

Issues: (i) Whether interest on the sanctioned customs-duty refund was payable from the expiry of three months after the initial refund application or only after reassessment; (ii) Whether the applicable rate of interest on the delayed refund was 6% or 12%.

Issue (i): Whether interest on the sanctioned customs-duty refund was payable from the expiry of three months after the initial refund application or only after reassessment.

Analysis: The initial refund application was filed while the request for reassessment of the bills of entry remained pending. The prolonged delay in reassessment and refund was attributable to Revenue. The applied principle of statutory interest on delayed refund requires interest to run upon expiry of three months from receipt of the refund application, rather than from the subsequent order granting reassessment or refund.

Conclusion: Interest is payable from 20.02.2019, being the date immediately following expiry of three months from the initial refund application. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the applicable rate of interest on the delayed refund was 6% or 12%.

Analysis: The applicable jurisdictional precedent concerning delayed refund supported interest at 12%. The factual circumstances of prolonged withholding of the refund justified application of that rate, while the period for which interest was payable remained unchanged.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum for the period from 20.02.2019 until refund of the duty, with Revenue liable to pay the balance 6% after adjusting interest already paid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The determination preserves the commencement date of interest fixed by the appellate authority and enhances the compensatory rate for the delayed customs-duty refund.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a valid refund claim is delayed, interest commences after expiry of the statutory three-month period from the refund application and cannot be postponed by delayed reassessment or refund processing.

Issues: (i) Whether writing off outstanding dues payable to suppliers, without writing off the corresponding inputs, requires reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 3(5B) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the disputed CENVAT credit.

Issue (i): Whether writing off outstanding dues payable to suppliers, without writing off the corresponding inputs, requires reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 3(5B) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 3(5B) requires payment equivalent to credit only where credit-availing inputs or unused capital goods are written off, fully or partly, or provision for such write-off is made. Its proviso confirms that the rule concerns goods treated as unusable and subsequently used. The record showed only a write-off of vendor liabilities, while the Chartered Accountant's certificate confirmed that the goods were not written off from the accounts. Revenue produced no evidence from stock records establishing that the inputs were written off or were not used in manufacture. A commercial reduction or extinguishment of an amount payable to suppliers does not, by itself, establish that the duty-paid inputs were not used.

Conclusion: Reversal of CENVAT credit was not required merely because outstanding vendor dues were written off. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the disputed CENVAT credit.

Analysis: The write-off entries were recorded in the books of account, and the audit had knowledge of the relevant write-offs through the spot memo issued in March 2015. The issue turned on the interpretation of Rule 3(5B), for which the assessee's view had support in the cited legal principles. These circumstances did not establish suppression of facts or intent to evade duty.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable, and the demand pertaining to that period could not be sustained. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A write-off of supplier liabilities, unaccompanied by proof that the credit-availing inputs themselves were written off, does not trigger the statutory credit-reversal obligation; recovery based on such entries also cannot be sustained through the extended limitation period without suppression.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule 3(5B) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 applies to a write-off of credit-availing inputs or unused capital goods, not merely to a write-off of amounts payable to suppliers, and Revenue must establish the requisite facts before demanding reversal of credit.

Issues: Whether a non-manufacturer contractor that collected from its customer an amount representing excise duty in excess of the duty actually paid on excisable goods was liable to deposit the excess amount with the Central Government.

Analysis: Section 11D(1A) applies to every person collecting an amount as representing duty of excise on excisable goods in excess of the duty assessed, determined and paid; its application is not confined to manufacturers. The accepted bid prices separately identified excise duty, and the invoices either separately reflected such duty or incorporated it in the accepted prices. The running bills also declared that statutory taxes and duties had been deposited. The amounts collected as excise duty exceeded the duty paid by the manufacturers. The cited decisions concerned materially different circumstances, including cum-duty pricing without collection of duty as such, blank duty columns, or absence of any excess duty collection.

Conclusion: The excess amount collected as representing excise duty was required to be credited to the Central Government under Section 11D(1A), with applicable interest; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether deferred annuity payments under the road concession agreements qualify for exemption as services by way of access to a road or bridge under Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate); (ii) Whether Circular No. 150/06/2021-GST dated 17.06.2021 impermissibly overrides the statutory exemption notification; (iii) Whether the earlier advance ruling exempting the petitioner precludes the Revenue from levying GST on the annuity payments.

Issue (i): Whether deferred annuity payments under the road concession agreements qualify for exemption as services by way of access to a road or bridge under Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Analysis: The agreements required design, construction, operation and maintenance of roads, with half the project cost paid during construction and the balance paid in biannual annuity instalments after commencement of operations. These reciprocal obligations constituted taxable works-contract services and a supply for consideration. Entry 23A covers only services of access to a road or bridge under Heading 9967; it does not extend to road-construction services falling under Heading 9954 merely because their consideration is paid by deferred annuities. An exemption entry cannot be expanded to cover works-contract services not expressly included.

Conclusion: The annuity payments are consideration for taxable works-contract services and are not exempt under Entry 23A. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Circular No. 150/06/2021-GST dated 17.06.2021 impermissibly overrides the statutory exemption notification.

Analysis: The circular distinguishes exempt access-to-road services under Heading 9967 from taxable road-construction services under Heading 9954. Section 168 authorises the Board to issue instructions and clarifications to secure uniform implementation of the statutory scheme. The circular was treated as clarificatory of the proper classification and scope of the exemption, rather than as an amendment or curtailment of the notification.

Conclusion: The circular validly clarifies that deferred annuity payments for construction of roads do not receive the Entry 23A exemption. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the earlier advance ruling exempting the petitioner precludes the Revenue from levying GST on the annuity payments.

Analysis: Taxability must be determined from the statutory notification and the true nature of the contractual services. An advance ruling based on a misreading of the applicable legal provisions cannot perpetually bind the implementing authorities where the statutory position is clarified under Section 168. The earlier ruling could not displace the conclusion that the services rendered were taxable works-contract services.

Conclusion: The earlier advance ruling does not bar GST levy on the annuity payments. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Deferred payments under the concession arrangements remain taxable as consideration for road-construction works-contract services, without the benefit of the exemption applicable to access-to-road services.

Ratio Decidendi: A deferred annuity paid as consideration for construction, operation and maintenance of roads is taxable as works-contract service and cannot be exempted as a service of access to a road or bridge merely because the payment is described as annuity.