Criminal prosecution and departmental exoneration: delay and tribunal findings did not justify quashing at the threshold.

Criminal proceedings were not quashed for delay where the record showed repeated adjournments, exemptions, stay orders and other steps contributed to by both sides, including the accused; delay alone was therefore insufficient to terminate the prosecution. The accused could not also rely on exoneration in departmental or tribunal proceedings, because a criminal court must decide the offence independently on the evidence before it and such findings are only a relevant circumstance, not a bar to trial. The defence could be raised before the trial court, but it did not justify quashing at the threshold.

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Issues: (i) Whether the criminal complaint and summoning proceedings were liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay in trial; (ii) Whether the prosecution could be quashed because the appellate tribunal had exonerated the petitioners in the departmental proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the criminal complaint and summoning proceedings were liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay in trial.

Analysis: The proceedings had remained pending for many years, but the delay was not attributable solely to the prosecution or the court. The record showed repeated adjournments at the instance of both sides, exemption from appearance of the accused, stay of proceedings, and delays in producing evidence. The petitioners themselves had contributed to the delay and had not originally raised delay as a ground for quashing. In these circumstances, the delay by itself was not treated as a sufficient basis to terminate the prosecution.

Conclusion: The plea for quashing on the ground of delay was rejected and was held against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution could be quashed because the appellate tribunal had exonerated the petitioners in the departmental proceedings.

Analysis: The criminal court was required to decide the offence independently on the evidence before it. The result of departmental or tribunal proceedings was relevant only as a circumstance and was not binding on the criminal court. Since the ingredients of the criminal offence still had to be proved in trial, the tribunal's finding did not bar the prosecution. The petitioners could raise their defence before the trial court, but that did not justify quashing at the threshold.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to quashing of the criminal proceedings on the basis of the tribunal's order.

Final Conclusion: The petition was not maintainable for quashing of the pending criminal prosecution and was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Criminal prosecution is not barred merely because departmental or tribunal proceedings have ended in favour of the accused, and delay will not justify quashing where the accused have themselves materially contributed to the protraction of the trial.

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