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<h1>Land acquisition challenge barred by constructive res judicata; vesting under Sections 28(4)-(5) KIAD Act, Section 11A inapplicable</h1> SC held that the appellant's challenge to acquisition of land under the KIAD Act was barred by constructive res judicata, as the issue of the land not ... Acquisition proceeding under Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (KIAD Act) - acquisition of land beyond the requirement of Framework Agreement (FWA) - applicability of principle of Constructive Res Judicata - principles of Res Judicata - no award was passed as contemplated u/s 11A of the Land Acquisition Act (βthe said Actβ) - non-publication of award and the consequential invalidation of the acquisition proceeding - HELD THAT:- The principles of Res Judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely, βinterest reipublicae ut sit finis litiumβ which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is βnemo debet his ve ari, si constet curiae quod sit pro un aet eademn causeβ meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should forever set the controversy at rest. It is nobodyβs case that the appellant did not know the contents of FWA. From this it follows that it was open to the appellant to question, in the previous proceeding filed by it, that his land which was acquired was not included in the FWA. No reasonable explanation was offered by the appellant to indicate why he had not raised this issue. Therefore, in our judgment, such an issue cannot be raised in this proceeding in view of the doctrine of Constructive Res Judicata. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in breach of the principle of Res Judicata is prima-facie a proceeding which has been initiated in abuse of the process of Court. On a comparison of the provisions, namely, Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. KIAD Act is of course a self contained code. The said Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Others, [2011 (1) TMI 1343 - SUPREME COURT], held that Section 11A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. This Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of appellant that acquisition under KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-Βcompliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the said Act. Appeal is dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Constructive Res Judicata and its applicability to writ petitions.2. Validity of land acquisition under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (KIAD Act).3. Applicability of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act to the KIAD Act.Detailed Analysis:1. Constructive Res Judicata and its Applicability to Writ Petitions:The appellant's attempt to relitigate issues previously decided by the courts was deemed an abuse of process. The principles of Res Judicata, which prevent re-litigation of issues already settled, were emphasized. The court highlighted that this doctrine is based on public policy principles such as 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' (it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation) and 'nemo debet bis vexari' (no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause). The court noted that the appellant had previously raised similar issues regarding the land acquisition, which were rejected up to the Supreme Court. The court reiterated that the principles of Constructive Res Judicata apply to writ petitions, as established in previous judgments and explained by the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra.2. Validity of Land Acquisition under the KIAD Act:The appellant contended that the land acquisition was beyond the requirements of the Framework Agreement (FWA) and hence invalid. However, the court noted that this issue had been previously adjudicated and upheld in State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organisation, where it was determined that the project was an integrated infrastructure development project, and the acquisition of land, even away from the main alignment of the road, was justified for public purpose. The court affirmed that the acquisition proceedings were carried out in consonance with the provisions of the KIAD Act for a public project of significant importance for the development of Karnataka.3. Applicability of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act to the KIAD Act:The appellant argued that the acquisition notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act was invalid as no award was passed within two years, as required by Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. The court rejected this contention, clarifying that Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act operate differently from Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under the KIAD Act, land vests in the state upon the publication of the notification, independent of the award-making process. The court referred to previous judgments, including Pratap v. State of Rajasthan and Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka, which distinguished the purposes and processes of different land acquisition statutes. The court concluded that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act does not apply to the KIAD Act, as the latter is a self-contained code.Conclusion:The court dismissed the appeal, reiterating that the issues raised were barred by principles of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata. The court emphasized the importance of finality in litigation to prevent abuse of the judicial process. The appellant was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 10 Lacs to the Karnataka High Court Legal Services Authority. The court also directed the State Government to complete the project promptly, ensuring that no actions, including land release, impede its completion.