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Issues: (i) whether the accused were entitled to discharge under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the prosecution under the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) whether the absence of sanction for Section 132 of the Customs Act, 1962 disabled cognizance for that offence; and (iii) whether the material disclosed a prima facie case against the eighth accused and attracted Sections 132 and 135 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): whether the accused were entitled to discharge under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the prosecution under the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The complaint was supported by preliminary evidence recorded under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, including statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 and documentary material relating to the seizure of currency, the recovery of gold bars, and the alleged fabrication of invoices. The standard at the discharge stage is whether the evidence discloses a case that, if unrebutted, could lead to conviction. On that material, the allegations were not found to be groundless.
Conclusion: The request for discharge was not tenable and was rightly rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the absence of sanction for Section 132 of the Customs Act, 1962 disabled cognizance for that offence.
Analysis: The sanction placed on record authorised prosecution for the offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and did not expressly mention Section 132. Since Section 137 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires previous sanction for cognizance of offences covered by that provision, the question of proceeding under Section 132 had to be examined by the trial court at the appropriate stage on the basis of the record and the sanction order.
Conclusion: The sanction objection did not warrant discharge at that stage, and the trial court was left free to consider the issue at the stage of framing charge.
Issue (iii): whether the material disclosed a prima facie case against the eighth accused and attracted Sections 132 and 135 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The Court found that goods for the purpose of Section 135 included the currency involved in the alleged transaction, and that the prosecution case alleged knowing involvement in fraudulent evasion and misdeclaration in relation to smuggled gold and its sale proceeds. The evidence also linked the eighth accused to the transactions through the sanction order, the alleged handover of currency, his employment in the jewellery concern, and the recovery of gold bars from the same premises. Questions about the depth of his involvement were held to be matters for trial, not discharge.
Conclusion: A prima facie case existed against the eighth accused and the prosecution under Sections 132 and 135 could proceed.
Final Conclusion: The revision petitions failed and the order refusing discharge was sustained, leaving the criminal prosecution to continue in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: At the discharge stage in a customs prosecution, if the preliminary evidence discloses a prima facie case of smuggling-related evasion and connected document fabrication, the accused are not entitled to discharge merely because sanction is disputed or further proof remains to be tested at trial.