Constitutional challenge must stay within the actual controversy; overbroad invalidation and tribunal jurisdiction were clarified.

A writ court must confine a constitutional challenge to the provisions actually in issue; the High Court's blanket invalidation of the Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1979 was therefore too wide and sustainable only as to the provisions concerning religious and charitable inams. Orders made by the competent tribunal during the period when the amendment was treated as invalid were protected by the de facto doctrine, and settled positions were preserved to avoid unsettling matters already decided. Jurisdiction over matters governed by the personal inam legislation was restored to the Land Tribunal for future and pending cases, with challenges to vires left open in an appropriate proceeding.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in declaring the entire Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1979 ultra vires when the challenge before it concerned only the amendment relating to religious and charitable inams; (ii) whether the Land Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the occupancy-right application after the Amendment Act had been struck down and what the consequence was for matters already decided or pending.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in declaring the entire Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1979 ultra vires when the challenge before it concerned only the amendment relating to religious and charitable inams.

Analysis: The challenge before the High Court arose in relation to provisions affecting religious and charitable inams under the relevant amendment. The validity of the amendments relating to personal inams was not in issue. A court exercising writ jurisdiction ought not to travel beyond the controversy actually raised and decide questions that are merely academic or unnecessary for the disposal of the lis. Since the challenge did not cover the provisions relating to personal inams, there was no justification for striking down the Amendment Act in its entirety.

Conclusion: The declaration of invalidity was too wide and was correct only to the extent it related to the provisions amending the law governing religious and charitable inams; the broader declaration was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the Land Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the occupancy-right application after the Amendment Act had been struck down and what the consequence was for matters already decided or pending.

Analysis: The Court treated the earlier striking down of the Amendment Act as having practical effect until altered, but held that the tribunal orders made during that period were protected by the de facto doctrine. At the same time, to avoid unsettling settled matters, the Court invoked stare decisis and preserved orders already passed by the competent authority after the date of invalidation. For the future, jurisdiction was directed to continue with the Land Tribunal in respect of matters governed by the personal inam legislation, including matters then pending before the Deputy Commissioner, leaving the parties free to raise any challenge to vires in an appropriate case.

Conclusion: The earlier tribunal orders were saved, future jurisdiction was restored to the Land Tribunal, and the remand to the High Court was ordered for disposal on merits.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded to the extent that the sweeping declaration of invalidity was set aside, the tribunal jurisdictional position was clarified, and the matters were remitted for decision in accordance with law without any determination on the merits of the underlying claims.

Ratio Decidendi: A court should confine a constitutional challenge to the provisions actually in issue and should not invalidate an enactment beyond the scope of the controversy; orders made by a competent authority during the operative period of an invalidated regime may be protected by the de facto doctrine, and settled legal positions should not be unsettled absent compelling reason.

---