Writ of prohibition may issue despite delay where reassessment jurisdiction is patently lacking and notice under section 34 is assailable.

Where lack of jurisdiction is patent on the face of the proceedings, delay in moving under Article 226 does not by itself bar a writ of prohibition, because the court may still restrain an inferior authority that has usurped jurisdiction. A notice issued under section 34 was treated as the first step in reassessment proceedings and as an assumption of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer, not a merely administrative act. The objection that the notice was outside the scope of prohibition therefore failed, and the writ was held to lie where reassessment jurisdiction was wrongly assumed.

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Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing the petition barred the grant of a writ of prohibition when lack of jurisdiction was patent on the face of the proceedings; (ii) Whether the issue of notice under section 34 was an administrative act or an exercise of quasi-judicial jurisdiction amenable to prohibition.

Issue (i): Whether delay in filing the petition barred the grant of a writ of prohibition when lack of jurisdiction was patent on the face of the proceedings.

Analysis: The governing principle applied was that the grant of writs under Article 226 is discretionary, but where an inferior authority has patently usurped jurisdiction, the writ ordinarily should issue unless an irresistible case for withholding it is shown. The distinction was drawn between a mere error in exercise of existing jurisdiction and a total absence of jurisdiction. Since the defect in jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the notice read with section 34, delay alone was not treated as a bar.

Conclusion: Delay did not defeat the petition, and the writ could properly be issued in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the issue of notice under section 34 was an administrative act or an exercise of quasi-judicial jurisdiction amenable to prohibition.

Analysis: The notice under section 34 was treated as the first step in reassessment proceedings, not as a purely administrative act. The power to initiate such proceedings was held to involve the assumption of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer, and a writ of prohibition could lie where that jurisdiction was exceeded or wrongly assumed. The contention that the officer acted only administratively was rejected.

Conclusion: The notice under section 34 was amenable to prohibition, and the objection based on administrative character failed in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded because the Income-tax Officer had patently assumed jurisdiction not vested in him, and prohibition was issued restraining further reassessment steps for the concerned assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: Where lack of jurisdiction is patent on the face of the proceedings, a writ of prohibition under Article 226 may be granted despite delay, and a reassessment notice initiating jurisdictional proceedings is amenable to such control.

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