Company vicarious liability limits punishment to statutory fine where imprisonment is not contemplated, with sentence interference only for gross inadequacy.

A director or officer proceeded against under a company-vicarious-liability provision was held liable only to the extent the statute permits for the company itself; where the punishment structure contemplated fine, imprisonment could not be imposed on that basis. Sentencing interference was also confined to cases of gross inadequacy. On the facts, the trial court had considered the accused's supervisory negligence and surrounding circumstances, so the sentence was not shown to be so inadequate as to justify appellate interference.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether a director or officer proceeded against under the company-liability provision could be sentenced to imprisonment or only to fine; (ii) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was so inadequate as to warrant interference.

Issue (i): whether a director or officer proceeded against under the company-liability provision could be sentenced to imprisonment or only to fine

Analysis: The liability created by the company-liability provision was read in the context of the punishment structure under the Act. Where the offence is committed by a company, the company itself can only be punished in the manner permitted by the punishment provision, and the expression "punished accordingly" in the connected sub-section was held to mean punishment in the same manner as would apply to the company. On that construction, a director or officer made liable under the vicarious-liability provision could not be subjected to imprisonment where the statute, in that setting, contemplated only fine.

Conclusion: The director or officer proceeded against under the company-liability provision was liable only to fine and not to imprisonment.

Issue (ii): whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was so inadequate as to warrant interference

Analysis: Sentencing was treated as a matter within the trial court's discretion. Interference was held to be justified only where the sentence was grossly inadequate. On the facts, the accused's role was one of negligence in supervision rather than direct responsibility for manufacture, and the trial court had taken the surrounding circumstances into account. The sentence, therefore, could not be characterised as so inadequate as to call for appellate interference.

Conclusion: The sentence was not shown to be grossly inadequate, and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the conviction-related sentence failed, and the rule was discharged.

Ratio Decidendi: A person made liable under the company-vicarious-liability provision is punishable only in the manner that the statute permits for the company, and appellate interference with sentence lies only where the sentence is shown to be grossly inadequate.

---